The Role of Governance and Public Administration in Developing a Foundation for Participatory, Peace-Sustaining Governance

by

Michael Meyer *

Introduction

The ability of administrative institutions and processes to develop policies and programmes in a participatory manner which anchor peace and reconciliation, and also enable themselves to act as resolvers and managers of conflict is critical to building long-term national capacity for sustainable peace and development. The brief of this paper is to explore how to best utilize various participatory governance mechanisms as instruments for conflict management in post-conflict situations. In particular, it explores participation, decentralization and local government capacity strengthening (with some reference to the South African experience) as strategies to prevent a resurgence of severe or violent conflict to constructively manage public policy issues and disputes, and to build long-term social cohesion and create a foundation for peaceful, sustainable development. Lastly, the paper attempts to forward a comprehensive strategy in developing a foundation for participatory, peace-sustaining governance.

What is conflict? Conflict is relative to its own reality - its origin, intensity, duration, manifestation, and interpretation. Keeping the human development focus in mind, conflict can be perceived as a threat to human security. Conversely, the quest for human security can also manifest as a threat to elitist proponents of disorder in pursuit of self-interest and greed. Some conflicts can be interpreted as ‘a cold war’ or ‘a long peace.’ Conflict means peace for some and tragedy for others. Whichever way one looks at it, against the background of resource scarcity, conflict is in some or other way driven by greed and/or grievance.¹ More concise - conflict is defined as a ‘social situation in which two parties are competing for the same scarce resources.’² Of relevance here is that conflict refers to the social situation and not to conflict behaviour as such. ‘The conflict can be latent or manifest. The conflict is not necessarily eliminated just because conflict behaviour ends.’³ Therefore, of further relevance to this project (that looks at post-conflict mechanisms) is that the concept of ‘post-conflict’ is therefore somewhat inadequate. Relapses to violence are common, unless basic problems are addressed and solved. The focus here will be on conflicts that are relevant from the perspectives of poverty, development and external development assistance.⁴

Where do we find conflict? Conflict is universal and at the same time rather peculiar to the nation-state. Internationally, the breakdown of nation-states can be generalized to a lack of vertical and horizontal legitimacy within societies.⁵ When there is a collapse or lack of vertical legitimacy, the relationship between the state and the society is detached. ‘The common

understanding and acceptance of the state elite’s right to rule on the basis of a set of norms, rules and values is at least partially compromised. Horizontal legitimacy refers to the membership and the definition of political communities. This kind of legitimacy is often lacking in war-torn societies characterized by ethnic struggle. ‘In these countries, there is no positive notion of political community. The different ethnic groups share no national identity, so that they have no bond of loyalty or feeling of national unity.’ It is argued elsewhere that ‘internal conflicts constitute challenges to the nation-state and, thereby, the nation-state system, or what we [call] the Westphalian system and its peculiar political logic’. It is further argued that the stability in Westphalian state formation ‘proved to be an illusion’, and that ‘states in all parts of the world are irreversibly challenged from within … Post-Westphalian political rationality, in contrast, assumes that the nation state has lost much of its usefulness and that solutions to problems of security and welfare must be found increasingly in trans-national structures, either multilateral (global) or regional.’

In addition, as elaborated later, the root causes of conflict in any society can hardly be localized to the local level, and therefore cannot be addressed through pure domestic assistance. Unless efforts at good governance as part of the peace building process take account of the link between governance at community, civil society/private sector, national, regional and international levels, and allow for and/or include all stakeholders in negotiations and the development of frameworks for peace building, calls and plans for demobilization, disarmament, good governance and international assistance for reconstruction and development, to mention but a few requirements, will be futile.

Why prevent or terminate conflict? To secure human security, which can be broadly defined as the individual or collective capacity to function productively and contribute to society. The basic needs of food, water, shelter, and safety are fundamental. However, these requirements for survival must be supplemented by the psychosocial inputs of identity, self-esteem, recognition, participation, and autonomy. ‘These psychosocial needs reflect individual and collective connections to self, others, and a sense of time. For assessment purposes, these needs are categorized as positive attachments to three domains: home, community, and the future. When connections to these domains are strong, resilience to external shock is increased, vulnerability mitigated, and the proclivity for conflict, crisis, and collapse decreases. To ensure more effective design and implementation of development programs, an assessment of an individual’s or a community’s hope for the future – the over-arching determinant of human security – will be critical.’

As a general point of departure and introduction, it should be noted that restructuring of governance and public administration after times of severe or violent conflict, never proceeds from a clean slate and that past animosities, violent behavior, etc., would still be prevalent. Especially important is the matter of retribution of past wrongs. If a government, whether the
existing or an interim, embarks on undertaking fierce retribution measures, chances for a successful and peaceful restructuring are most likely inevitably ruined.

A country which is ravaged by violent conflict, would in most cases, be left without a viable system of government or a well-functioning public administration. In order to reconstruct governance and public administration it would therefore be of the utmost importance to establish some kind of transitional or interim government to undertake the most important government tasks, especially security, basic services, health, etc. In cases where such an interim government cannot be formed, the presence of some or other international or internationally accepted peace force would be the answer. In cases where the existing government is still in place (e.g. in the case of the suppression of a rebellion by a part of the population), it would in severe cases be recommended that the existing government calls for a mandate by the people by way of general elections, or install on its own accord an interim emergency rule with the clear prospect of having general elections after the lapse of a fixed period.

Of course, the presence of an international peace force immediately puts the independence and sovereignty of the country in question in doubt. An internationally agreed assurance (passed as a UN Security Council Resolution) of the country’s sustained sovereignty after a certain period of time and the fulfillment of specific conditions may be the solution.

The most important and immediate tasks of such a preliminary or interim government, (whether the existing government which undertakes emergency rule, or a newly formed interim government with or without international participation) would be:

- The provision of **basic services** such as security, health, education, infrastructure, etc. Public finances and government spending must be singled out as a terrain of much importance. Issues around ‘security’ have to be particularly carefully planned and monitored after times of disruption (since in most cases ‘disruptive’ forces still prevail). It is not to be forgotten that often in times of so-called restructuring, suppression and retaliation of previous rebellion and insurrection are most brutal.

- A well-functioning system of **public administration** does not come painless, especially after times of violent conflict. In view of this, training of public administrators, supportive elites and influential pro-reform cronies, must be a priority. In this respect, the establishment of a ‘school of public administration/governance’ with the assistance of international institutions, and the training of selected administrators abroad, could be considered (e.g. a statutory body such as the South African Management Development Institute). However, as much as training abroad could be helpful, it is important to remember that training of public administrators and government officials should be contextual and the country/region specific narrative as a foundation.
• Constitutional restructuring/reform is rather often seen as a process that comes only after peace has been established and state functions are more or less in place. It is important to stress that constitutional reform must be undertaken from the very outset, since such reform would be vital for the establishment of a more lasting peace and settlement. At the same time, constitutional reform should be subject to not only what is really meant by ‘what is constitutional’, but also stating explicitly ‘what is not’. For example, the AU has resolved that it does not recognize ‘unconstitutional transfers of power’, however, without any explicit norm/s attached. ‘Standards for constitutional rule need to be set and continually raised. Given the absence of real mechanisms for enforcement in the hands of African institutions, much of the work for the foreseeable future must consist in developing consensus, thereby promoting the subjective conditions for a possible peace and security order.’

• If the interim period between the designing of a constitution and its implementation lasts too long, the transition will most likely get jammed automatically. If the implementation of the constitution is not embedded in socio-economic and institutional transformation at the local level (as well as in political transformation at the medium and the top levels), it will probably not be worth the paper it is written on.

All the above functions, tasks and processes call for immediate and constant public participation and public awareness. Whatever reforms for governance and public administration are undertaken, they must, through public participation and information dissemination (transparency), be built on a legitimate basis. Admittedly, the processes of public participation and public awareness might be weak and insufficient after times of massive disruption, but they must be confronted, planned and expanded conjunctively with all the other processes of reform.

It speaks for itself that a successful process of restructuring must be accompanied by a system of oversight, monitoring and evaluation, with the possibilities of solving disputes, correcting false moves and sustaining the various processes. Again, the participation of the international community would be necessary (also, probably, through the UN) to make oversight and monitoring effective and active.

Restructuring of governance and public administration is not simply something that happens. It must be well planned and executed, and in this respect, the timing of the various processes is vitally important. Equally important is the necessity to plan the restructuring processes in different progressive phases with adequate provision for reporting, assessment and monitoring.

In order to be successful, restructuring programmes and processes must be based on a vast network of crosscutting and intertwining agreements and accords. If not, restructuring
programmes will not carry legitimacy, and in addition the responsibility for their effective execution will be left in a void. Agreements, by their very nature, demand the contracting of partners. Part of the restructuring process must therefore be the identification, investiture and training of such partners. Various schemes will have to be worked out in this respect, and through nomination, selection, appointment and election, the relevant partners in the whole network of agreements will have to be established. This demand for effective and legitimate partners in the restructuring process is often neglected and often leads to a massive failure of the process, as well as other joining calamities such as corruption, ineffectiveness, rejection and opposition, and often a severe suppression of those partners who could be valuable partners in the restructuring process. This is often the case where an existing government, after the suppression of a military rebellion or civil uprising, stays in place to undertake the restructuring process.

Needless to say, any attempt to assist in building peace-sustaining governance to achieve economic development and to alleviate human suffering, it is necessary to enter into a process of reconstruction of the state. The literature suggests that traditional approaches for development assistance have proved to be woefully insufficient in reconstructing the state, and that there is need for a more comprehensive approach. ‘A new political, economic and social environment must be established and society rebuilt. One often cited catchword in this context is ‘good governance’. As defined by the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, the good governance of a country consists of four core elements: rule of law, management of the public sector, anti-corruption, and reduction of excessive military expenditures, as well as three further associated elements: participatory development, democratization, and respect for human rights. Good governance alone is of course not sufficient to meet the pre-conditions for sustainable peace and development, since it only serves to re-establish vertical legitimacy and does not yet provide for the horizontal legitimacy that can enable a plural society to function on the basis of a wide consensus of fundamental values. Thus, whole groups within such a state can still feel estranged from it and lack a common identity, one that would bind these different groups together as a nation.’

It is noted that international actors, be they Governmental Organisations or non-governmental organisations in particular, focus on aspects of state reform such as: participation and democratization, federalization and decentralization, constitution and justice reform, security sector reform, and dialogue-oriented or intermediary institutions. ‘These activities can be brought together into three strings that summarize the most important challenges to state reform: a) the need to foster participation and democratization in order to enhance social and political stability, b) the need for institutional reform in order to create and maintain a more durable societal fabric and c) the need for comprehensive security sector reform.’
Although all such challenges need to be addressed in a non-linear integrated and contextual manner, I will focus particular attention to three distinct and interrelated mechanisms, i.e. participation, decentralization, and local government strengthening as agents for building a foundation for peaceful and sustainable development. For illustrative purposes, where relevant, examples from the South African narrative will be provided.

**Participation**
The involvement of community members in choosing their own and collective destiny, in its creation, in its functioning and in making sure that developmental and peaceful sustainability in the long term are secured, falls within the ambit of what is referred to variously as participatory governance, participatory democracy, participatory development or people centered development. It is useful here to situate the participatory paradigm within the broader context of state-civil society relations. Broad participation of all sectors of civil society is of utmost importance in guaranteeing lasting peace and sustainable development, since participation ‘transforms’ individuals into citizens with duties and rights. This occurs in accordance with the norms established by the state. Such norms will be designed and approved by a parliament representing different social groups in society and functioning under the rule of law. This creates a situation where the monopoly of the use of violence belongs exclusively to the state, which thus guarantees law and order, and sovereignty.

**State-civil society relations**
The democratic state can be divided into four spheres: the state (the administration), the public sphere (political parties), civil society (civic institutions/social movements) and the primary or individual sphere (family, clan, individual). It can be argued that the public sphere and the institutions of civil society mediate the relationship between the state and the primary sphere. Civil society is comprised of a broad range of associative institutions, including the media, trade unions, business, sports and religious organizations, non-governmental organizations and community organizations. In other words, civil society encompasses all elements of active citizenship, reaching from the local level (Council of Elders), across the mid-level (NGOs, intellectuals), to the top level (government representatives) and actively combines the various societal sectors.

There are two models of how civil society should operate: the corporatist model and the voluntary pluralist model. The former involves the state “incorporating” institutions that have a proven constituency and can hold them to agreements into decision-making arrangements. The voluntary pluralist model involves the institutions of civil society remaining at a greater distance from the state and acting as ‘watchdogs’ to ensure that the state fulfils its constitutional mandate.
It is imperative that associations of civil society have a genuine constituency and that the leadership is democratically elected at regular intervals, that the leadership is accountable to its constituency and that these associations respect one another’s right to exist. Civil society thus buttresses the state by binding citizens to the rules of democratic politics and in the process ‘civilizing’ private associational life. By ensuring the accountability of the state, civil society institutions integrate citizens into the norms of democratic life. This ensures a mutually reinforcing relationship between the state and civil society, since only a democratic state can create a free democratic civil society, and only a free democratic civil society can sustain a democratic state.

**Participatory democracy**

Participation by citizens in decision-making is not just a tool to legitimate what government wants to implement. It is argued for example that in the ‘new’ South Africa, participation must not merely become a legitimating process. ‘It should be an essential component of a broad political program in which local knowledge becomes a driving force for social transformation.’ Participation plays an important role in capacitating especially poor people to become active citizens. Poor rural communities who have lived with neither the requisites for dignified existence nor the capacities to change their circumstance become psychologically disempowered. Their situation may be described as ‘institutionalized pathology’ or ‘learned helplessness.’ In order to overcome this helplessness, communities need to gain local control of resources. Participation can thus be expressed as ‘... achieving power in terms of access to, and control of, resources necessary to protect livelihood.’

It is important for the organs of civil society, such as civics, development forums and committees, and political parties, to establish a working relationship with formal government structures which:

- Moves beyond the mere ‘demands’ of protest politics and incorporates both a watchdog role as well as a developmental one;
- Does not lead to co-option and the inevitable corruption that this spawns;
- Takes into consideration the particularities of local politics, especially in the rural areas; and
- Recognizes that ‘communities more often reflect division and competing interests than they do harmony and common purpose.’

At any level, institutional reform or institutionalized reform is therefore critical for the reconstruction and democratic development of failed states. ‘If we are to solve the problems caused by the breakdown of government and ensuing civil strife, structures must be established in order to re-legitimize state power and make the peaceful management of conflicts possible.’

**Decentralization**

Decentralization can help reduce poverty, achieve other development goals and promote social cohesion, peace and national unity. Local governance and local elections can ensure
transparent, democratic power sharing, allowing a voice for different political parties. Decentralization can be seen as a strategy that underpins and ties good governance and public participation with sustainable harmonious governance. The shift from a basic service function to one of promoting development follows a global trend of decentralization. According to the United Nations Development Programme, decentralizing governance, from the center to regions, districts, local governments/authorities and local communities, can be an effective means of achieving improved access to services and employment, increased people participation in decisions affecting their lives, and enhanced government responsiveness. At a rather more ‘organizational’ level, decentralization can be defined as ‘the transfer of authority or responsibility for decision-making, planning, management, or resource allocation from any level of government to its field units, district administrative units, other levels of government, regional or functional authorities, semi-autonomous public authorities, parastatals, private entities, and NGOs or voluntary organizations.’

Decentralization – some advantages

While there is no conclusive evidence as to the impact of decentralization on livelihoods, decentralization does seem to have a positive effect on the performance and responsiveness of service delivery organisations. The main recorded benefits have been:

Administrative – deconcentration

- A reduction in bureaucracy and improved responsiveness as government is brought closer to its clients/citizens;
- Institutional capacity building at local level;
- Better scope for partnership development with organisations outside government; and
- Promotion of innovation (which is important if we are looking for new institutional responses to poverty).

Political – devolution

- Increased transparency and decreased corruption;
- Increased participation in decision-making (which tends to unlock the latent capacity of rural communities);
- Increased job satisfaction and improved motivation as staff cohere together in ‘client-centric problem solving approaches to service delivery, giving rise to trusting and respectful relationships between clients and public servants’;
- Improved targeting of the poor; and
- Better identification and implementation of micro-projects (e.g. through demand-driven rural investment funds).

Fiscal

- Decentralization has proved to be a cost effective way of administering government. Local government structures have usually increased the local resource base, both by collecting their own taxes and by lobbying for allocations from the center.

Possible negative consequences of decentralization

Administrative – deconcentration

- Accountability usually remains to the center. This can increase central power, which now permeates much lower down, unless provision is made to develop a system of local accountability.
- Traditional patron-client relations between administrators and villagers may prevent villagers from pressing their demands.

Political – devolution

- The legal framework specifying the powers and responsibilities of local government is often unclear which reduces accountability. This can be a particular problem where
decentralization is legislated quickly, often for political reasons, without thought as to how it will be implemented (as in Lesotho).

- Sometimes apparent devolution can also increase central political power (as happened in Zambia in the 1980s when District Governors were appointed by the ruling party and the right to vote was restricted to party members).
- Accountability in a devolved system often remains weak and more strongly oriented to the center than to local voters. This can be a critical flaw.
- Elites may capture new local government positions and then ignore the poor.
- Local governments are often hamstrung by a lack of funds and so lose credibility.
- What corruption remains tends to become more obvious. This can create the impression that corruption has in fact increased (this happened, for example, in Karnataka, India).
- Greater inequalities develop between communities and regions with different levels of organizational capacity.
- There can be an expansion of unnecessary bureaucracy.
- Decentralized authorities have a foreshortened time perspective, which can have a negative impact on issues such as the environment.

**Fiscal**

- The raising of local taxes tends to be unpopular and difficult, meaning that larger central contributions may be needed at the outset. Later, as local governments gain credibility, local contributions can rise.

**Decentralization – some caveats**

Decentralization is a complex organizational and social process. The international literature offers some important pointers and caveats for decentralization. There are at least four important issues to keep in mind:

- **Negative aspects and unintended consequences:** Decentralization may have problematic unintended consequences, and measures have to be taken to alleviate these;
- **Sectoral differentiation:** In some sectors, the negative aspects of decentralization are more evident than others. There is therefore a prima facie case in some sectors to have a lower degree of decentralization than in other sectors;
- **Complementary initiatives required:** It is important to recognize that decentralization may not be a sufficient condition for improved service delivery, although it may be a necessary condition. There are other interventions that have to be taken alongside the decentralization process (e.g. municipal capacity-building) for the process to achieve the desired results.
- **Process:** A decentralization process will inevitably be slow and lengthy. Some international precedents exist for the way in which the functions of municipalities should be increased.

A common thread is that decentralization should be done holistically, i.e. redefining the entire intergovernmental system with a clear idea of what the strategic purpose and goals of decentralization are. For example, the situation appears more complex when one tries to differentiate the impact of decentralization on various sectors. Once again it is difficult to isolate the impact of decentralization on livelihoods. However, there is some evidence that decentralizing health and education yields benefits for both livelihoods and organizational performance. For example, reports on results from Papua New Guinea demonstrate substantial improvements in health (notably a lowering of infant, childhood and maternal mortality and increased life expectancy) as a result of devolution.
In South Africa (SA) for example, decentralization aims at promoting ‘developmental local governance’. According to the South African Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Strategy (2000), ‘South Africa is in an ideal position to take on board one of the key lessons of the international experience; namely, that successful rural development must be implemented in a participatory and decentralized fashion in order to respond to articulated priorities and observed opportunities at the local level.’ Following the SA White Paper on Local Government ‘developmental municipalities’ can be defined as ‘municipalities committed to working with citizens and groups within the community to find sustainable ways to meet their social, economic and material needs and improve the quality of their lives.’

There are some key implications to this:

- A participatory dimension to municipal government, democratizing and empowering;
- Promotion of sustainable development, and considering social, economic and material needs – implying that developmental municipalities have extensive and multisectoral roles;
- Playing an integrating and coordinating role; and
- Municipalities leading and learning – and able to respond to their local environment and the rapid changes in the world around.

Many local authorities in South Africa are currently struggling to take up the challenge of ‘developmental government’. One of the reasons for this is confusion about the roles of the spheres of government in delivery of services. The current confusion about powers and functions of provincial and local governments, linked to the lack of human and financial capacity, obstructs operational functioning. This is particularly damaging for addressing the social needs in under-serviced rural areas, since primary health care, education, housing, and welfare are not local municipal functions. At the same time, there are local municipalities that run clinics without electricity and doctors because of lacking infrastructure, financial and/or skills support. Thus, within the terrain of ‘developmental’ local government, and decentralization of service delivery, clear definition of roles between spheres of government is required. Decentralized government implies stronger powers to raise revenue locally and clearer delegation of authority and responsibility. This needs to be clarified and codified.

**Decentralization and peace nexus**

The state as an instrument of development can be used by a government either to frustrate or encourage development. It can hinder or actively undermine development through a variety of measures, ranging from erroneously equating economic development with economic growth, and therefore not paying attention to the distribution of wealth, to simply using power to accumulate personal wealth. Concomitantly, a government can use the security apparatus of the state to create and maintain a secure environment in which its development strategies might flourish, or it can use this apparatus to support and assist its plundering of resources.

‘Decentralization is neither a panacea for conflict transformation nor a guarantee for the protection of minority rights. If it is perceived by rigid elites as a threat to their central power (and especially to the allocation of resources), decentralization can well lead both to the
mobilization of war-constituencies and to the rise of separatist movements. Thus, decentralization can provoke new conflicts at local levels, degrading social services and state performance, and opening the gap for the widespread corruption of local ‘aristocracy’. 38

‘If this is not to occur, decentralization will need to be driven by a power-sensitive, process-oriented and balanced strategy, one thoroughly informed by national and local circumstances. That strategy must first of all generate a commitment for decentralization on the part of all the major actors, thereby stimulating broader participation in political decision-making. To the extent that it can improve the responsiveness of the central administration and effectively introduce the principle of subsidiarity, decentralization can then indeed enhance the accountability and legitimacy of a government, while at the same time strengthening local self-help capacities. The OECD/DAC lists four different channels for donor support for decentralization. Donors can (1) provide specialized technical assistance in the field of planning, administration, resource allocation, etc.; (2) clarify functional responsibility between central and local levels of government (including fiscal revenues and tax systems); (3) strengthen organizational capacities of representative intermediary bodies such as regional Parliaments, local councils, etc.; and (4) enhance the representation of marginalized groups in civil service posts at all levels of the administration (including affirmative action). 39 In terms of peace promotion, decentralization only makes sense in the context of an overall qualitative change of structures and institutions. In many developing and transitional states, it is in fact less a process of decentralization (as evident, at least in part, in France during the last ten years) that can make a difference but rather a kind of reconstruction of state functions from below, one designed to prevent an autocratic re-centralization of power.’ 40

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<th>In search of good governance and peace in Mozambique*</th>
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<td>In terms of premises for success and constraints on the road to peace, changes were made in legal and administrative terms, though power relations remained a serious issue. Considering the nature of the state, citizens at local level saw decentralization as an answer to the issue of participation. It was an integral part of a policy focused on enlarging the ‘effective national territory’, thus bringing citizens closer to state institutions and to other communities. Moreover, it was also a way to consider power sharing without necessarily having to form a government of national unity. Decentralization thus constituted a political administrative policy to encourage and enhance participation at community level, and provide a ‘natural’ space for political parties to participate in political life, in the event that they could not do so at national level. More inclusiveness was supposed to be an outcome, in the end building citizenship from below while lending wider legitimacy to the state.</td>
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<td>Decentralization did not pledge cost sharing in development, only to increase the costs of services for citizens thereafter, but decentralization had as its aim the enhancement of the concept of citizenship. Besides strengthening civil society and the plural political setting of the country, another purpose of decentralization was to strengthen the state. In fact, a strong, functional state was necessary to programme, implement and sustain the reforms and the new political administrative setting. A state was envisaged that would function under the rule of law, with the executive, legislative and judiciary powers functioning accordingly at the side of responsive and responsible participant citizens. A strong state was to be constructed after peace was made, in which development was to be inclusive and as all embracing as possible. It was to include the majority of individuals and geographic regions as part of the policy of decentralization, and was to be sustainable in accordance with the principles of ownership it proposed.</td>
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<td>Ownership in this context meant sharing decisions and responsibility, and defining priorities locally. It also meant avoiding general impositions made valid for all under the principle of universal values, which are generally demanded by the international community and, at times, embraced by the ruling elite</td>
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without considering local particularities. The principle of participation is very important in the case of Mozambique, as it constitutes a basis for inclusion. Community participation is equally important as the model according to which social groups are organized. Participation is to be understood as a foundation of ownership and sustainability in guaranteeing peace and constructing development. In fact, decisions based on participatory principles are more easily embraced and accepted by the majority who approve them, than those imposed by a higher power, even if legitimated by the international order that recognizes the sovereignty of states. The government programme approved in 1995 considered reconstruction in its broadest sense. However, local participation was less visible in spite of a legal framework for local government approved in 1994. The programme did not address principles for community participation based on the inclusivity of citizens and regions in the national state, counting rather in this case upon broader political participation in terms of party politics. The framework of local government under the label of decentralization was later redesigned to exclude rural areas, considering that it was better to implement the programme gradually in urban areas, and to follow this up in detail and introduce changes as the need arose. Only after this was done would the exercise be extended to rural areas. There were also reports of the poor performance of Frelimo in the rural areas during the first national elections, which contributed to the decision to exclude the rural areas from the process of municipal government. The new approach to municipal government was contrary to the principle of peace without exclusion and prejudice as mentioned above. Some citizens had the chance to elect local authorities and plan for participation in local government, while others were excluded. The new law therefore hindered full participation. The law was not inclusive and not based on consensus across party lines, leading to an electoral boycott by the opposition and 85% absenteeism among voters.42

Strengthening local government capacity

Local government in South Africa has undergone fundamental transformation aimed at redistribution of services and efficient use of scarce resources on the one hand and to promote development and accountability on the other hand.43 It has become necessary for local government to move away from service delivery on a limited basis (sidewalks and sewerage) to focusing on broader socio-economic development and service delivery to a wider range of communities, many of who live in absolute poverty, particularly rural areas. However, this shift in focus is not an easy political or organizational transformation. The demarcation process and the amalgamation of municipalities is a process that municipalities across the country are struggling to come to terms with. The total of 843 apartheid based municipalities has been reduced to 284 municipalities – this includes 6 Metro’s, 47 District municipalities and 231 Local Municipalities.

The lack of sufficient resources results in under-investment in new infrastructure and poor maintenance. Social development (health, education, employment, safety, etc.) is to a large extent dependent on the development and maintenance of infrastructure. For instance, clinics and schools in rural areas often have no electricity, clean water and proper sanitation is difficult to access because of sparse spread and low population density, poor roads and public transport. In water services, for instance, there are celebrations for 9 million rural people being connected to piped water and yet 22 million households lack sanitation. As importantly 1300 clinics and 18 500 schools are not connected.44

‘It is through service delivery that local authorities have their greatest impact on the local economy. This is not only through services provided directly to formally established businesses but also through services which support employees in allowing them to get to work, for example. Also services provided to households improve their opportunities for informal economic activity and advancement of their own abilities to work, through study, for example.’ 45 Local government plays a key role in the fight against poverty by providing free
and affordable basic municipal services to poor households, particularly for water, electricity and sanitation.

**Capacity development**

The South African Local Government Association sees ‘capacity’ as a mixture of the state of development and democracy in the municipal area; structural/base capacity; operational capacity; performance; and commitment to growing capacity. But it is more complicated than that. ‘Training and education is only one factor in building capacity – building capacity also includes other factors, such as the ability to access funding, technology, administrative resources, equipment, information, support and collaborative partnerships. Without the accompaniment of these factors, training and education…may only frustrate.’

It is further suggested that the coordination of existing resources and competencies and the management of information are key roles that coordinating bodies such as Local and District Municipalities should undertake.

**Current capacity of local government**

Although there is progress in the delivery of social services, bureaucratic bottlenecks, uncertainty about roles, and limited resources (such as skilled professionals and finance) result in inadequate levels of services to the poor, particularly in rural areas. There are also often considerable distances between administrative centres and rural communities and difficulties in communications. In addition, there is a fairly rapid turnover of staff as companies often take up experienced social consultants.

Municipalities in South Africa are spread across the capacity continuum. There are those that do have the capacity, ambition and leadership to address the challenges of transformation with creativity and determination, while others are unable to fulfill even the most basic functions of local government. According to the South African Ministerial Advisory Committee (MAC) on the challenges facing local government the current local government transformation process dwarfs, in its magnitude and complexity, any other institutional change that has ever happened in the history of South Africa. However, the strategic thinking, and financial and other resources available to plan and implement it, has been relatively limited. The MAC observes particularly the actual lack of financial and institutional capacity, skills and experience in smaller local authorities. This has also been confirmed in other studies.

Developing competent and responsible local government is central to capacity building.

The South African Local Government Association in collaboration with the Local Government and Water Sector Education and Training Authority aims to improve the ‘know-how’ to support restructuring and rising service delivery demands. The impact of capacity and training initiatives undertaken so far seems to have been unsatisfactory. No proper and comprehensive skills audit has been undertaken. Initiatives are uncoordinated, developed in *ad hoc* ways, with generic foci rather than tailored to suit specific needs. A new ‘good practice Workplace Learning Framework for local government’ and a ‘skills development
improvement strategy for local government’ have been proposed recently.\textsuperscript{54} In addition, since donor agents undertake numerous capacity development programmes, however uncoordinated and fragmented, the need has been identified to create a Donor Forum to streamline capacity development activities in such a way that it becomes a concerted and well-coordinated effort, supporting realistic national objectives and not necessarily the diverse objectives and schemes of donor agents.\textsuperscript{55}

Further, in order to adequately assess and address local capacity constraints one needs to understand the context in which South African local government operates and the implications of the still very new developmental role of local governance.

**Intergovernmental relations**

Chapter 3 of the South African Constitution provides for principles of co-operative government and intergovernmental relations (IGR) between the three ‘spheres’ (not ‘tiers’) of government. IGR are important to balance responsibilities with resources, capacity and accountability.\textsuperscript{56} Many municipalities, however, express concern in respect of the effective management of intergovernmental relations, from national to provincial, to local government; between national government departments; and between divisions within departments, including within the National Department of Provincial and Local Government.

Thus far, the focus in IGR has been on provincial collaboration and sectoral integration, i.e. horizontal cooperation. What is seriously lacking is cooperation between provinces and local government, i.e. vertical cooperation. This can be partly explained by the lack capacity among provinces to deal with their mandate of monitoring and supporting local government in terms of personnel, funds, institutional knowledge and expertise.\textsuperscript{57}

**Structural capacity constraints**

Structural changes have taken place in local government. In South Africa, the demarcation process still haunts some municipalities with minimum base and operational capacity who struggle to fully establish and stabilize. This is especially the case in the poor rural areas that have an historical backlog in managerial, operational and fiscal capacity and are now confronted with servicing large geographic areas and high turnover of staff, especially in district municipalities. A large number of smaller municipalities have been emasculated as a result of the demarcation/amalgamation and rationalization process. One of the major problems with attracting competent and qualified staff is the problem of a loss of higher job grades, since many have been downgraded since the restructuring as the result of the demarcation process.\textsuperscript{58} This is an area that needs attention from the government in terms of funding. One way of dealing with this problem of poorer municipalities having lower grades and thus less qualified staff, is to subsidize higher grade positions through the equitable share grant, specifically through the a pre-determined poverty indicator (I-component).
Another study of municipal capacity found that none of the municipalities in the Eastern Cape Province had the necessary capacity to implement projects without assistance. All of the municipalities have accepted the support offered by the Municipal Monitoring Programme. Municipal capacity constraints include the lack of financial resources, technical expertise and ‘adopted’ procurement procedures, the capacity development of the ‘wrong people’ and political capture - the occupation of influential positions by inexperienced and inappropriately qualified people. The municipal restructuring process has in many cases been unsuccessful and, as a result, staff does not possess the required appropriate skills.

At the same time, local government needs to accelerate the delivery of quality services, including water, electricity, refuse removal, roads, health, housing and community-services. These services need to be extended to the poor, i.e. non-profitable areas/sector. This coupled with decentralization of functions to local government has pushed the need for a ‘balanced’ agenda of increasing fiscal transfers and capacity building, together with the clarification of municipal roles and functions on top of the local government agenda.

Capacity constraints related to the development paradigm

Capacity constraints should not merely be regarded as human and financial lack in capacity to deliver basic services, but foremost in terms of adapting to the paradigm of ‘developmental local government’. Presently, no national framework is available to give direction into how to translate the developmental role into concrete structures and policies in South Africa. In addition to the structural transformations, the changed roles of local government require municipalities to actively engage in the socio-economic development of its population and area of jurisdiction.

A local response to reverse the trend in declining economic activity is encouraged and facilitated through the SA Local Economic Development Fund (LEDF). The LEDF programme under the auspices of the Local Government Transformation Programme has been implemented and presents a great learning opportunity for local governments in South Africa and other countries.

The lack of municipal capacity to interpret and implement LED is the single most constraining feature of the LEDF and of other LED programs. Underlining the inability to manage LED projects adequately is the inability to generate meaningful Integrated Development Plans. LED projects suffer from the linked weaknesses in the Integrated Development Planning processes and failure to conceptualize LED within a holistic framework of development. Consequently, isolated projects are generated with little bearing on spatial or economic planning principles at local level, and at the same time not aligned with district or provincial priorities.

A recent study in the Eastern Cape on LED shows that in terms of existing institutional flows across the spheres of government, the province plays a pivotal role in project screening, and,
in theory, monitoring and evaluation, while disbursements occur directly from the national level to the local level, where implementation of projects and financial management problems are frequently encountered. When these problems become critical, the provincial government is required to ‘trouble shoot’. However, having had no control over the municipal Integrated Development Planning process, project selection, Business Plan generation, project implementation and financial management, this role is difficult to fulfill within the current institutional and political constraints, other than superficially.

What the above analysis reveals is that the implementation of the changes to the local government system in South Africa, brought about as a result of the demarcation project is still in its early stages. New municipalities with vastly increased areas of jurisdiction, especially underdeveloped rural areas, present challenges that will not be solved in the short-term. Most importantly, while the amalgamations of rural areas with urban municipalities has improved the capacity for conventional service delivery, the real problem lies in moving from this conception of local government functioning to a broader developmental one of ‘governance’.

Clearly, fundamental steps are made in addressing structural and development capacity problems, e.g., training officials and councilors, conditional grants for economic development and infrastructure, integrated development planning and addressing intergovernmental relations. However, what remains problematic is how to translate developmental and participatory governance into accelerated and pro-poor service delivery.

**Towards a comprehensive strategy for developing a foundation for participatory and peace sustaining governance**

There is no single strategy that can provide peace and security to Africa. Strategies should focus on the different stages of conflict, i.e., conflict prevention and peace building, conflict resolution and containment, and post conflict reconstruction. Strategies also need to be undertaken simultaneously at local, civil society, national and regional levels, in the social, political, military and economic spheres. As mentioned earlier, unless efforts at good governance as part of the peace building process take account of the link between governance at local through to international levels, and allow for and/or include all stakeholders in negotiations and the development of frameworks for peace building, calls and plans for demobilization, disarmament, good governance and international assistance for reconstruction and development, to mention but a few requirements, will be in futility. Strategies need to be simultaneously ‘objective’, dealing with the substantive issues and the institutional mechanisms for responding, and ‘subjective’, in developing the awareness, understanding and expectations of leaders at all levels. They need to move beyond purely military definitions of security to more comprehensive and strategic visions. The following three tables attempt to summarize some of the kinds of activities that can be undertaken.
## Conflict prevention and peace building

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Economic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Community</strong></td>
<td>~Teaching of non-military values in schools.</td>
<td>~Maintenance of effective dispute resolution</td>
<td>~Management of common resources in a way so as to minimize conflict potential.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>~Promoting inter-communal dialogue.</td>
<td>mechanisms.</td>
<td>~Poverty alleviation and provision of work and education opportunities for all.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>~Small arms control.</td>
<td>~Empowerment of women and youth.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>~Community based information systems.</td>
<td>~Transparency.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>~Community based information systems.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>**Civil society /</td>
<td>~Engagement of civil society stakeholders in public debate on security issues.</td>
<td>~Promotion of civil and political rights, transparency and good governance.</td>
<td>~NGO/CBO promotion of service provision, sustainable development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>private sector**</td>
<td></td>
<td>~Inclusion of all constituencies, promotion of gender equity.</td>
<td>~Good corporate citizenship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National</strong></td>
<td>~Limited use of emergency measures.</td>
<td>~Equitable representation of different ethnic/religious/social groups in government.</td>
<td>~Adequate remuneration for soldiers, including health care and pensions.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>~No proliferation of special forces or militias.</td>
<td>~Devolution of powers.</td>
<td>~Limitations on military spending.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>~Transparency about military spending.</td>
<td>~Freedom of movement and regional citizenship.</td>
<td>~Controls on military and security involvement in commerce.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>~Civilian control of the military and security services.</td>
<td>~Securing freedom of association - language, culture, religion and tradition, particularly for minority groupings.</td>
<td>~Reward Public Private Partnerships and corporate social responsibility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional</strong></td>
<td>~Confidence-building measures between countries such as publishing national military budgets and troop levels.</td>
<td>~Promotion of norms of good governance, utilizing peer pressure, e.g., AU Peer Group Reviews.</td>
<td>~Functioning of regional mechanisms and institutions e.g., management of shared resources, e.g., cross border pastures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>~Creation of credible regional intervention forces.</td>
<td>~Establishment and development of regional fora for dialogue and dispute management.</td>
<td>~Promotion of intra-regional trade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>~Development of national and regional security doctrines to promote predictability and transparency in interstate relations.</td>
<td>~Regional civil society organisations also have roles in this regard.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International</strong></td>
<td>~Development of credible international intervention forces.</td>
<td>~Enhancement of conflict early warning and timely intervention systems.</td>
<td>~Increased predictability, mutual accountability in aid relations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>~Training for military, police, security services.</td>
<td>~Support to civil society initiatives.</td>
<td>~Increased support to key social sectors.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Conflict resolution and containment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Economic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For local conflicts, traditional moral restraints on conflict can be invoked.</td>
<td>For local conflicts communities can invoke adapted traditional dispute resolution mechanisms.</td>
<td>Promotion of fair and equitable access to and control over local resources.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support influence of Faith Based Organizations (FBOs)</td>
<td>~For national conflicts, little can be done.</td>
<td>~Human rights monitoring.</td>
<td>~For local conflicts, civil society initiatives are possible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For national conflicts, less is possible.</td>
<td>~Advocacy for peace (where possible).</td>
<td>~Promotion of dialogue across conflict lines, e.g. contact with counterpart groups on the ‘other side.’</td>
<td>~For national conflicts, very little is possible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community based information systems.</td>
<td>~Promotion of dialogue on post conflict issues.</td>
<td>~Proximity talks; preparatory talks, high level talks, adoption of common values and principles: all the modalities for mediation available, bilateral, facilitated or mediated.</td>
<td>~Avoidance or minimization of military and security involvement in commerce.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society / private sector</td>
<td>~Political liberalization, opening up space for civil society.</td>
<td>~Increased respect for human rights and humanitarian principles/promotion of culture of peace.</td>
<td>~Regional CSOs can support or augment national CSO efforts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For local conflicts, civil society initiatives are possible.</td>
<td>~Increased respect for human rights and humanitarian principles/promotion of culture of peace.</td>
<td>~Monitoring and controlling illegal export of commodities from the affected country.</td>
<td>~Monitoring adherence to IHL.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For national conflicts, very little is possible.</td>
<td>~Facilitation or mediation of peace talks of various kinds.</td>
<td>~Assistance to refugees, combined with protection, demilitarization of refugee camps etc.</td>
<td>~Arms embargoes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>~Regional CSOs can support or augment national CSO efforts.</td>
<td>~Regional CSOs can support or augment national CSO efforts.</td>
<td>~Carrots and sticks to encourage the parties towards negotiation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measures to ensure respect for the Geneva Conventions and provide humanitarian access to war affected populations.</td>
<td>Measures to contain the conflict and prevent its spreading to neighboring countries.</td>
<td>~Support to community based and civil society initiatives.</td>
<td>~Facilitation or mediation of peace talks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>~Ceasefire, augmented by mechanisms for monitoring.</td>
<td>~In regional conflicts, the range of peace initiatives outlined above.</td>
<td>~Facilitation or mediation of peace talks of various kinds.</td>
<td>~Monitoring and controlling illegal export of commodities from the affected country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>~Mechanisms for separation of forces, creation of security zones, encampment, etc.</td>
<td>~Facilitation or mediation of peace talks of various kinds.</td>
<td>~Regional CSOs can support or augment national CSO efforts.</td>
<td>~Advance planning for post conflict economic rehabilitation and recovery.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>~Regional CSOs can support or augment national CSO efforts.</td>
<td>~Monitoring and controlling illegal export of commodities from the affected country.</td>
<td>~Monitoring adherence to IHL.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrictions on arms flows, prohibition on use of military bases in neighboring countries.</td>
<td>~In regional conflicts, the range of peace initiatives outlined above.</td>
<td>~Support to community based and civil society initiatives.</td>
<td>~Arms embargoes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>~Facilitation or mediation of peace talks of various kinds.</td>
<td>~Humanitarian assistance.</td>
<td>~Monitoring adherence to IHL.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring and containing illegal export of commodities from the affected country.</td>
<td>~Support to community based and civil society initiatives.</td>
<td>~Monitoring adherence to IHL.</td>
<td>~Arms embargoes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Management of post conflict transition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Economic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| ~Rehabilitation and reintegration of former combatants.  
~Local control of small arms supplies.  
~Humanitarian mine action.  
~For local conflicts, traditional moral restraints on conflict can be invoked.  
~Support influence of Faith Based Organizations (FBOs) | ~Reconciliation between formerly hostile communities.  
~Rebuilding of judicial institutions. | ~Rehabilitation of essential services. |
| Civil society / private sector | ~Assistance to veterans’ associations to become articulate and responsible members of civil society. | ~Promotion of democracy, human rights etc., including active participation in rebuilding institutions.  
~Promotion of reconciliation. | ~Support to social service provision, income generating projects, micro credit etc.  
~Engagement in policy debate and monitoring of post conflict rehabilitation programmes. |
| National | ~Creation of a national army and security forces committed to democratic sovereignty.  
~Establishment of a comprehensive nationwide programme for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants and security officers. | ~Establishment of democratic procedures and institutions.  
~Civilization of national political life.  
~Rebuilding national institutions.  
~Truth and reconciliation forum.  
~Securing social safety nets for war veterans. | ~Development of plans for rehabilitation of war stricken areas, return and resettlement of refugees and IDPs, economic reintegration of demobilized former combatants, and relaunching the economy.  
~Development of new financing schemes for rehabilitation. |
| Regional | ~Provision of peace-keeping forces as appropriate.  
~Monitoring adherence to military protocols in peace agreements. | ~Supporting and monitoring implementation of peace agreements.  
~Promotion of regional civil society initiatives and networks. | ~Assistance for refugees to return.  
~Promotion of regional integration, cross border trade and other measures. |
| International | ~Provision of peace-keeping forces as appropriate.  
~Monitoring adherence to military protocols in peace agreements.  
~Support (financial and technical) to military reform and demobilization. | ~Institutional support to key ministries, departments for reconstruction.  
~Engagement in policy dialogue to promote democratization and reconciliation plans over a realistic time frame  
~Support to civil society initiatives. | ~Sequenced economic assistance to support transition from conflict through rehabilitation to growth/development.  
~Providing conditionality free assistance to rehabilitation and recovery plans through trust funds and similar initiatives.  
~Accelerated debt relief. |
Conclusion and recommendations

The challenge for Africa is confronting the call for ‘thinking the unthinkable’ and being creative in responding to these challenges. Other regions can provide lessons and parallels but Africa has to develop its own collective institutions through its own political will. The much-maligned slogan ‘African solutions to African problems’ does not mean that Africa is an island untouched by global forces, but is a call for African ownership and originality in these matters. At the same time Africa needs to rid itself from being ‘unpredictable’. The only way to confront peace, security, secrecy and development is for unconditional transparency and good governance.

In a broader sense, this paper explored participation, decentralization and local government capacity development as mechanisms for the prevention of resurgence of severe or violent conflict to constructively manage public policy issues and disputes, and to eliminate marginalization and social exclusion, and create a foundation for peaceful, sustainable development. Lastly, the paper attempted to provide a comprehensive strategy in developing a foundation for participatory, peace-sustaining governance.

The key recommendations emanating from this discussion include the following:

- The nation state has lost much of its usefulness and that solutions to problems of security and welfare must be found increasingly in trans-national structures, either multilateral (global) or regional.
- To ensure more effective design and implementation of development programs, an assessment of an individual’s or a community’s hope for the future and the overarching determinant of human security will be critical.
- The most important and immediate tasks of a preliminary or interim government, (whether the existing government which undertakes emergency rule, or a newly formed interim government with or without international participation) would be the provision of basic services; a well-functioning system of public administration constitutional restructuring/reform; immediate and constant public participation and public awareness; a system of oversight, monitoring and evaluation, and a vast network of crosscutting and intertwining agreements and accords.
- Participation by citizens in decision-making is not just a tool to legitimate what government wants to implement. Participation must not merely become a legitimating process, but also an essential component of a broad political program in which local knowledge becomes a driving force for social transformation and sustainable peace.
- Decentralization has positive and negative consequences. Decentralization has to be driven by a power-sensitive, process-oriented and balanced strategy, one thoroughly informed by national and local circumstances. Such a strategy must first of all generate a commitment for decentralization on the part of all the major actors, thereby stimulating broader participation in political decision-making. To the extent
that it can improve the responsiveness of the central administration and effectively introduce the principle of subsidiarity, decentralization can then indeed enhance the accountability and legitimacy of a government, while at the same time strengthening local self-help capacities.

- Training and education is only one factor in capacity development. More importantly, it should include factors such as the ability to access funding, technology, administrative resources, equipment, information, support and collaborative partnerships. Without the accompaniment of these factors, training and education may only frustrate.

- Capacity constraints at the local level should not merely be regarded as human and financial lack in capacity to deliver basic services, but foremost in terms of adapting to the paradigm of ‘developmental local government’.

- There is no single strategy that can provide a foundation for participatory and peace sustaining governance. Strategies should focus on the different stages of conflict, i.e., conflict prevention and peace building, conflict resolution and containment, and post conflict reconstruction. Strategies also need to be undertaken simultaneously at local, civil society, national and regional levels, in the social, political, military and economic spheres.

- Unless efforts at good governance as part of the peace building process take account of the link between governance at local through to international levels, and allow for and/or include all stakeholders in negotiations and the development of frameworks for peace building, calls and plans for demobilization, disarmament, good governance and international assistance for reconstruction and development, to mention but a few requirements, will be futile.
4 Also see Hettne, Björn. Poverty and Conflict: the Methodology of a Complex Relationship. Padrigu, Gothenburg University.
21 Friedman, S and Reitzes, M. Democratization or bureaucratization?, in Transformation 29, 1996
27 ‘Institutional reform should ideally address at least the following areas: constitutional reform, power-sharing arrangements, devolution of power and decentralization, protection of minorities, rule of law, and human rights. All of these objectives are, of course, closely interrelated.’ See Bächler, Günter. 2003. Conflict Transformation through State Reform, in Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation. Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management.


36 Several in depth studies conducted by the HSRC revealed that the problems municipalities are struggling with are to a large extent due to uncertainty about roles, related to this inadequate intergovernmental relations and lack of funding of local government's developmental mandate.


44 Stats SA. Expenditure and Spending in South Africa: Selected findings and comparisons from the income and expenditure surveys of December 1995 and October 2000.


46 A capacity building and skills development strategy for South African municipalities. SALGA, May 2003.


50 Sector Skills Plan, LG&WSETA, April 2003. Various sector reports of the Municipal Demarcation board, such as Municipal powers and function health sector report, 2000.


52 SALGA intends to embark on a nationwide skills audit in the near future to determine the capacity development needs of councilors and officials. (Interview with SALGA official, 26 June 2003).

53 A capacity building and skills development strategy for South African municipalities. SALGA, May 2003.

54 Interview with South African Local Government Association (SALGA) official, 26 June 2003

55 This need has been identified by the United Nations Capacity Building for Local Governance Programme and Kagiso Trust, 2002.

56 Weist, Dana. Intergovernmental systems for small urban areas. World Bank, March 2003.

For example, the Western District Council when it became Cacadu District Municipality lost many of its higher graded posts. This was primarily because it lost a large portion of its revenue to the Nelson Mandela Metropole. As a result many of its qualified staff had to leave. Similar problems will confront the Amatola District Municipality (Eastern Cape Province) when Buffalo City becomes a Metro.


