Policy Integration: 
A Strategic Triangle of Challenges

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Where I’m coming from…

Integration across development objectives is a tremendous challenge...

- To balance three essential aspects of sustainable development in policymaking
- To identify and articulate *tradeoffs* and *synergies* and *integrative strategies* as a part of policy portfolio
...made more difficult by a shifting context:

*To increasingly complex problems...*
…and from ‘Government’ to ‘Multi-level Governance’

International

National

Intermediate

Local

PUBLIC

PEOPLE

PRIVATE

(typical national program)

Typical challenge for integrated policymaking and implementation

(typical NGO program)
‘Central government’ players in policy integration as important than ever,

**but new thinking is needed on critical processes and capacities that will make integrated policymaking work in practice.**
Two Additional Dimensions of Integration needed, across:

- *Developmental objectives*
- *Stages in the policy process*
- *Capacities in the governance system*
Integration must take place across existing **policy processes**

- **For the coherence of policy design**
- **To institutionalize sustainable development policies through continuity in the policymaking process**
- **To enhance policy learning through multiple policy cycles**
Integration must take place across existing governance capacities

"Analytical capacities":

- Continuous scanning of environment
- Problem identification and prioritization
- "Evidence-based policymaking" – thinking ahead, thinking across, thinking again
- "Pick important problems and figure out what will solve them"
“Operational capacities”:

Building effective organizations – good structure, good “hardware” (infrastructure, equipment) and good “software” (people, culture, motivation), good leadership

Implementation in networks: mobilizing and deploying resources effectively across sectors and organizations

May need to build new capacities to solve new problems

Making course corrections
“Political capacities”:

Managing conflicting opinions and demands

Getting to a decision, a working consensus

Getting authorization from multiple levels to proceed

Building stakeholder support

Engaging the public and non-government actors

Keeping support active long enough to get things done
The hard part: dynamic integration on three levels!
Example 1: The decentralization trend in public governance (system of systems)

Example 2: The complexities of counter-terrorism policymaking

(consider what happens if you miss)
Example 1: Decentralization trends

- Widespread acceptance as goal, but...
  - multiple ideologies: which problem are you trying to solve? Bloated government? Inefficiency? Low responsiveness to different local needs? Low participation of citizens?
  - Uneven support...center may say it wants decentralization, but does it really mean that?
  - Uneven implementation capacity, including at center

➤ Expect oscillation, not unidirectional process
“…the key question is no longer whether to decentralize. It is how best to design intergovernmental structures…to achieve optimal results. […] Though East Asia’s decentralization has come later than in some other parts of the world, it is now here to stay.”
Example 2: Counter-terrorism policymaking

- Classic wicked problem, prone to poor problem diagnosis and poor policy design, in particular...

- Blunt military and law enforcement instruments applied in isolation that threaten to cause greater blowback
WASHINGTON, DC—Speaking via closed-circuit television from the Oval Office Monday, President Bush made a direct plea to Osama bin Laden to form a nation the U.S. can attack. "Whether you take over an existing nation like Afghanistan or create a new breakaway republic called, say, Osamastan, the important thing is that you establish an identifiable nation-state with an army, a capital, and clearly defined borders," Bush said. "Maybe you could also sign some quick treaties to definitively establish who your allies are." The president then pledged $600 million to bin Laden for the construction of a state-of-the-art defense headquarters that the U.S. can bomb.
Nato intelligence chief condemns failings of US in Afghanistan

Report denounces lack of local knowledge

By Matthew Green in Islamabad

Nato's top-intelligence officer in Afghanistan has issued a scathing critique of US military intelligence-gathering, warning a failure to understand local communities has deprived commanders of information needed to contain the Taliban.

Major-General Michael Flynn, a veteran US intelligence officer, depicted commanders cocooned in bases surrounded by analysts with only a hazy grasp of the concerns of the people the west has vowed to protect.

"Moving up through levels of hierarchy is normally a journey into greater degrees of cluelessness," wrote Maj-Gen Flynn and his co-authors in a report released yesterday. "US intelligence officers and analysts can do little but shrug in response to high-level decision-making; seeking the knowledge, analysis and information they need to wage a successful counterinsurgency." He said analysts often felt their jobs were "more like fortune-telling than serious detective work".

The report will renew concerns over the capability of US intelligence in the wake of a suicide attack that killed seven Central Intelligence Agency personnel in Afghanistan last week and the attempt to blow up a US airliner on Christmas day.

The report was published as officials sought to ascertain how a Jordanian man reported to be an al-Qaeda double agent was able to infiltrate a military base in eastern Afghanistan last week and inflict the biggest death toll on the CIA in one day in more than 25 years.

The report was commissioned by the Center for a New American Security, a US think-tank, before the latest incidents, and focuses on the US military and civilian analysts employed by the department of defence.

Written in a tone bordering on exasperation, the report quotes one US officer as saying: "I don't want to say we're clueless, but we are. We're no more than fingernail-deep in our understanding of the environment."

The report said intelligence officials and analysts are "ignorant of local economics and landowners, lazy about who the powerbrokers are and how they might be influenced . . . and disengaged from people in the best position to find answers".

Maj-Gen Flynn's report is a departure from the traditional approach to military intelligence as chiefly a means to discern the intent of opposing forces, instead stressing the need for officers to understand the cultural complexities of their hosts.

http://www.ft.com/afghanistan
Looking ahead: The big questions

We have to deal with policy design/process, operational capacity, and politics of different systems.

Goal: Expand the overlap
“Analytical capacities”:

- What are the key instruments that are being deployed and that are working?
- How can we take better account of implementation, evaluation and policy learning stages?
- How to develop a multi-level governance approach to integration?
“Operational capacities”:

• How to adapt interorganizational incentives and administrative culture?

• How to synergize with other administrative reforms, including decentralization and digital era governance reforms?

• How to adapt Policy Integration programs to fit different clusters of countries with different governance capacities?
"Political capacities":

Where reforms out of the limelight only get so far… how to build and tap productive coalitions behind technically sound reforms…

…at all levels of the governance system…

…long enough to get anything done and intensely enough to address the tremendous dangers we face.
Thank you and look forward to your insights!