The Establishment of Career Civil Service System in the Korean Government
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Prepared by
Korea University
Sungkyunkwan University

Author
Sang Ok Choi, Korea University, Associate Professor
Sung Min Park, Sungkyunkwan University, Associate Professor

Advisory
Hong Kap Kim, Local Finance Association, CEO
Pan Suk Kim, Yonsei University, Professor

Research Management
KDI School of Public Policy and Management

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Preface

The study of Korea’s economic and social transformation offers a unique opportunity to better understand the factors that drive development. Within one generation, Korea has transformed itself from a poor agrarian society to a modern industrial nation, a feat never seen before. What makes Korea’s experience so unique is that its rapid economic development was relatively broad-based, meaning that the fruits of Korea’s rapid growth were shared by many. The challenge of course is unlocking the secrets behind Korea’s rapid and broad-based development, which can offer invaluable insights and lessons and knowledge that can be shared with the rest of the international community.

Recognizing this, the Korean Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF) and the Korea Development Institute (KDI) launched the Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP) in 2004 to share Korea’s development experience and to assist its developing country partners. The body of work presented in this volume is part of a greater initiative launched in 2010 to systematically research and document Korea’s development experience and to deliver standardized content as case studies. The goal of this undertaking is to offer a deeper and wider understanding of Korea’s development experience with the hope that Korea’s past can offer lessons for developing countries in search of sustainable and broad-based development. This is a continuation of a multi-year undertaking to study and document Korea’s development experience, and it builds on the 40 case studies completed in 2011. Here, we present 41 new studies that explore various development-oriented themes such as industrialization, energy, human resource development, government administration, Information and Communication Technology (ICT), agricultural development, land development, and environment.

In presenting these new studies, I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to all those involved in this great undertaking. It was through their hard work and commitment that made this possible. Foremost, I would like to thank the Ministry of Strategy and Finance for their encouragement and full support of this project. I especially would like to thank the KSP Executive Committee, composed of related ministries/departments, and the various Korean research institutes, for their involvement and the invaluable role they played in bringing this project together. I would also like to thank all the former public officials and senior practitioners for lending their time, keen insights and expertise in preparation of the case studies.
Indeed, the successful completion of the case studies was made possible by the dedication of the researchers from the public sector and academia involved in conducting the studies, which I believe will go a long way in advancing knowledge on not only Korea’s own development but also development in general. Lastly, I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Joon-Kyung Kim and Professor Dong-Young Kim for his stewardship of this enterprise, and to the Development Research Team for their hard work and dedication in successfully managing and completing this project.

As always, the views and opinions expressed by the authors in the body of work presented here do not necessary represent those of the KDI School of Public Policy and Management.

May 2013

Joohoon Kim

Acting President

KDI School of Public Policy and Management
Contents | LIST OF CHAPTERS

Summary .................................................................................................................................................. 10

Chapter 1
Overview of the Korean Career Civil Service System ................................................................. 11
1. Development of the Korean Career Civil Service System ......................................................... 12
2. Main Characteristics of the Korean Career Civil Service System ........................................... 16

Chapter 2
Significance of Korean Career Civil Service System and Its Developmental Process ........... 21
1. Theoretical Foundation for the Korean Career Civil Service System .................................. 22
2. Necessary Conditions for the Establishment of the Career Civil Service System: In the Korean Context .................................................................................................................. 24
3. Developmental Process of the Korean Career Civil Service System .................................. 26
4. Summaries and Implications ................................................................................................. 29

Chapter 3
Drawing on and Analyzing the Best Practices of the Korean Cases ........................................ 31
1. Drawing on and Analyzing the Best Practice: Based on the Periods of Development .......... 32
2. Drawing on and Analyzing the Best Practice: Based on Governmental Units .................. 41
   2.1. Best Practice of Government Ministries ........................................................................... 41
   2.2. Best Practice of Local Government .............................................................................. 42
3. Drawing on and Analyzing the Best Practice: Based on Cooperative Governance .......... 46
Chapter 4
Difficulties and Lessons in Implementing the Korean Career Civil Service System .................................. 51
1. Difficulties and Problems in Implementing the Korean Career Civil Service System .......................... 52
2. Lessons ............................................................................................................................................. 56

Chapter 5
Suggestions for Developing Countries ........................................................................................................ 59

References ........................................................................................................................................... 62
Contents | LIST OF TABLES

Chapter 2
Table 2-1  Competition Rate of Civil Service Examination [09~12] ......................................................... 25
Table 2-2  Merits and Demerits of The Career Civil Service System ......................................................... 28

Chapter 3
Table 3-1  Main Details of The Career Civil Service System ................................................................. 37
Contents | LIST OF FIGURES

Chapter 1
Figure 1-1  Implementation System of Education and Training for Public Officials of Korea ······ 17

Chapter 2
Figure 2-1  Features, Conditions and Necessities of The Career Civil Service System ····················· 24
Summary

As part of a knowledge sharing program which intends to share in-depth knowledge about the Korean development experiences with researchers and practitioners in developing countries, this report concerns itself with the story of the Korean career civil service system. This research consists of five Chapters. First, Chapter 1 (Overview section) introduces the development of Korean career civil service system and its main characteristics. Chapter 2 analyzes the significance of the Korean career civil service system and its process of development. Specifically, this chapter sheds light on 1) the theoretical foundation for the Korean career civil service system; 2) the conditions and necessities of the establishment of career civil service system within the Korean context; and 3) the developmental process of the Korean career civil service. Chapter 3 of this report introduces and analyzes a couple of best examples from Korean cases based on three different dimensions (i.e., time periods, government units, and patterns of governance). Chapter 4 reflects on the major difficulties and lessons learned through the implementation of the Korean career civil service system. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes this report by providing several practical suggestions and advice for developing countries attempting to eventually develop, implement, and evaluate their own civil service system.
Overview of the Korean Career Civil Service System

1. Development of the Korean Career Civil Service System
2. Main Characteristics of the Korean Career Civil Service System
Overview of the Korean Career Civil Service System

1. Development of the Korean Career Civil Service System

Modern government organizations are both directly and indirectly involved in the policy processes. Since public officials are key players in these organizations, they often determine the success of an administrative policy, and influence the development of a nation and the lives of its people. As such, public personnel administration is an important subject which deals with planning, recruiting, training and motivating public officials who hold a key position in the policy process (Palumbo & Maynard-Moody, 1991:163; Seung Bin Im, 2000:5; Chun Oh Park et al, 2001:3).

Faced with growing criticism of the inefficiency of public personnel management, the Kim Administration (1998 - 2003) and Lee Administration (2008 - present) pushed the idea of small government, with slogans such as “small and efficient government” and “practical government,” emphasizing the importance of active personnel management in order to increase productivity. On the other hand, the level of expertise required by the administration continues to grow as technology becomes more complex and areas covered by the administration becomes wider. Specialists in the field are now required to speak foreign languages and possess negotiating skills, while advances in information and communications technology are bringing new challenges every day. As the demand for change in values, attitude, skills and knowledge of public officials increase, the importance of personnel administration grows as well (Lim, 2000: 4; You, 2010: 9~11). In addition, the time now calls for a life-time reward system for public officials. Welfare, including wages and pensions, is an important part of personnel management, maintenance and long-term security of competent human resources.
Korea’s first public personnel administration system — known as the Career Civil Service System — was established by the National Public Service Act (Act no. 44) in August 1949. This Act attempted to ensure fairness in personnel management and increase efficiency, aiming to rebuild Korea in the wake of the imperialist Japanese regime. The first version of the National Public Service Act was set up as a merit-based system within the personnel administrative system, and emphasized political neutrality and equal opportunity in civil service appointments. A public official’s high status was automatically guaranteed (Joong Yang Kim & Myong Sik Kim, 2000:3).

Despite its beginning as a merit-based system, Korea’s public personnel administration operated as a spoils system under the US Military government until the National Public Service Act was amended by the Third Republic in 1963. Due to the weakened power of the Ministry of Government Administration, the personnel administrative agency was in its early stages. Proper regulation of each interior department became difficult when its minister was not appointed to the Cabinet, and most of the employees were recruited not through examinations, but through their statuses. Pro-Japanese bureaucrats, policemen, and soldiers made up a significant percentage of hired public officials. In fact, only five percent of all public officials were selected through open competitive examinations, and even those to be hired as level five public officials (current level nine) were not tested. There were logical standards or means of informing, promoting, or further training the officials. This kind of spoils system was exacerbated by the formation of the Liberty Party in 1954 (Dong Suh Bak, 1984:56~61; Joong Yang Kim; Myoung Sik Kim, 2000:4~5).

In 1961, the Third Republic reformed personnel administration. Key provisions of reform included the revision of the Civil Service Act, reinforcement of training, preparation for position classification system, rigorous administration of competitive examinations, salary increase, reinforcement of status guarantee, and revision of the national pension and personnel inspection (Dong Suo Bak, 1984:61). All public officials were divided into three classes (managerial, administrative, and technical) through the position classification system, and each class had its own ranking system. The two examinations for recruitment, the higher civil service and qualification examination, were merged into one open competitive examination.

The Fourth Republic revised the Civil Service Act twice in 1973 and 1978. Adjustments were made to parts concerning special recruitment, open competitive recruitment examination, promotion, and leave of absence system. Vocational high school graduates and students with advanced degrees and research experience were specially recruited in order to advance the field of science and technology. Preference was given to applicants who did well on the required examinations: employees then received special bonuses and promotions, were allowed to take leaves of absence to study abroad for approximately two
years, or work in foreign organizations. A personnel system of employing civilians to work on special business projects was adopted as well (Joong Yang Kim & Myong Sik Kim, 2000: 10~13).

The Fifth Republic established a fair merit-based system in order to improve professionalism and efficiency of the administration. First, it changed the types and class names of public officials into those used today. Public officials were divided into career service and non-career service groups, in exchange to the simplistic “regular” and “privileged” positions of the past. The career service group was further divided into “regular government service,” “special service” and “technical post.” The non-career service group was divided into “political,” “privileged government,” and “professional and labor services.” Class names were changed according to levels. The grievance procedure system was newly established to handle the difficulties faced by public officials, personnel management and working conditions. New standards were also established for the promotion of public officials above level 3. The open competitive examination or promotion examination became a requirement for employees in level 5 who wanted to be promoted to level 6. The power of the central personnel management agency was expanded to include the right to appoint public officials over level 5, establish human resource exchange plans, and form committees in charge of reviewing and adjusting salaries. The Fifth Republic reinforced discipline and increased the retirement age for public officials below level 6 (Joong Yang Kim & Myong Sik Kim, 2000:13~15).

The Sixth Republic took the career civil service system further by redressing several imperfections in human resource affairs and the special employment system. It increased the retirement age of public officials from 58 to 61, and reinforced the guarantee of personnel status system by improving the relief and dismissal system. Categories in the special employment system were also expanded, allowing recruitment of specialized scientists, technicians, economists with ties to foreign countries, manual laborers, and other skilled workers who faced difficulties in taking the open competitive examinations (Joong Yang Kim & Myong Sik Kim, 2000: 16~18).

The Kim Young-sam Administration (1993~1998) standardized performance-based pay, and made it possible to appoint and promote deputy directors (level 5). Maternity and housework leave system was also established, while people with global knowledge and foreign language skills were now being specially recruited through the special employment system. Leave of absence was extended to three years, and underperforming employees were now dismissed through the performance evaluation or appraisal system. Public officials specializing in a specific field were renamed as temporary employees, whose range had broadened (Joong Yang Kim & Myong Sik Kim, 2000:19~21).
The Kim Dae-jung Administration (1998~2003), following the newly emerging wave of neo-liberalism, applied merit-based performance and promotion system to human resource affairs. The Civil Service Commission of the president was established to set basic policies and manage official work related to personnel administration. The administration set certain job standards for positions requiring professionalism, prompting the establishment of the open position system which hired people from both inside and outside the public office. Maternity leave could be denied only in extenuating circumstances, and new systems of performance-related pay and objective management were implemented (Joong Yang Kim & Myong Sik Kim, 2000:22; Chun Oh Park et al, 2011: 10).

The Roh Moo-hyun Administration changed the employment process through various systems. Broadly speaking, the process was modified from closed to open format, from class-based to job-based, from generalist to specialist, and from seniority-based to outcome-based (The Civil Service Commission, 2005: 39; Chun Oh Park et al, 2011:10). First, the Civil Service Commission and the Ministry of Public Administration and Security were combined into one entity, the Civil Service Commission. This commission became responsible for all human resource-related policies and their execution. Other autonomous systems were set up for other services, such as the open type employment and Senior civil Service Management (Pan Seok Kim et al, 2007:63~64). Second, discrimination based on sex, educational background, and birthplace was officially banned. The administration also emphasized the representative nature of public offices by hiring more women, handicapped, and local people. Third, the Career Development Plan system was established, and job rotation was put into practice in order to enhance performance and professionalism in public offices. Fourth, the entrance process for public office was simplified as open type employment was expanded (Jae Ho Lee, 2008: 3~4). Fifth, the Senior Execution Service was introduced in July 2006 to increase the efficiency of head public officers who were responsible for decision making and management of main policies (Personnel Office in MOPAS). Sixth, outcome management was reinforced through performance evaluation and salary alteration. Finally, working conditions were improved as legal labor unions formed and family-friendly working system and welfare system were introduced and expanded (Seok Hong Oh, 2007:32~34).
2. Main Characteristics of the Korean Career Civil Service System

The Korean public personnel administration system is a rank-based combination of the career civil service and position classification systems. Employment, education, performance evaluation, promotion, compensation, welfare, protection of rights and moral responsibility comprise the main features of Korean public personnel administration system.

Employees are selected through examinations based on open and performance-related theories. Regular government service is divided into nine levels, while research and education services are divided into two. The Senior Civil Service is intended for public offices over level 3. There are two different types of examinations prior to employment: the open competitive examination and the work experience competitive examination. The open competitive examination is for individuals without prior work experience, while the work experience competitive examination is for professionals or those who do have experience (Civil Service Act Art. 8, Art 31). The open recruitment exams are divided into three types: level 5 (regular service, administration service, technological service, foreign service), level 7 (administration service, technological service) and level 9 (administration service, technological service). The examinations - different for all kinds of jobs ranging from prosecutor affairs to agriculture - are conducted by the minister of Ministry of Public Administration and Security. The minimum age for regular service is twenty for level 7 and higher, and eighteen for technological services or level 8 and below; maximum age is not set. Discrimination based on educational background had been banned in 1973 (MOPAS).

Second, all central organizations, related educational organizations, and MOPAS educate and train public officials. MOPAS establishes basic rules and policies to develop, support, and evaluate their education process. MOPAS is also responsible for commissioning employee education both within and outside of Korea. Each central administrative agency is responsible for educating its own personnel about its policies and other relevant departments. Public office education institutes are responsible for providing basic education of prospective officials and professional education for current workers. There are thirty related central institutes (e.g. Central Officials Training Institute), fifteen local training institutes, and six Fire Service Academies. Education and training takes place both domestically and abroad. Domestic education has several components: long-term training for section chiefs and bureau directors, commissioned education in universities and graduate schools, commissioned foreign language education, and privately commissioned professional education. Long and short-term education abroad may take place in English speaking countries (U.S.A., U.K., Canada, Australia, etc.), non-English speaking countries (Japan, Germany, France, etc.) and other regions (China, Russia, Latin America). Long-
term education is intended for senior civil servants, while short-term education is for other individuals, teams, and associations (Education and Training of Public Officials Information Center in MOPAS).

**Figure 1-1 | Implementation System of Education and Training for Public Officials of Korea**

*Education & Training Institution for Local public officials: 15 Institution of Each Metropolitan City and Province, 16 Institution of Each Metropolitan and Provinicial Offices of Education

Source: Homepage of Education & Training Information Center for Public officials in Ministry of Public Administration and Security

Third, Korean public officers over level 4 are evaluated by the job performance agreement system for senior civil servants and public officers. Those below level 5 are evaluated by the performance evaluation system for public officers. These results can be used for deciding promotions, bonuses, education, training, placement, etc. (Personnel Office in MOPAS).

The job performance agreement system is for the public officers over level 4. More than two facts from the individual performance evaluation - the department unit performance evaluation and the performance related ability evaluation - must be both accepted by the evaluator and evaluatee. The evaluation is carried out with standards set by an evaluation index. The British Senior Civil Service System lists job performance goals and their plans and puts them into a contract between its public officials and the minister. Bonuses are distributed based on job performance. The Performance Agreement of the Canadian Senior
Civil Service uses evaluation results to raise salaries or distribute single payment bonuses based on the contract of ministries and members of the Executive Group.

On the other hand, public officers under level 5 are rated by the experience and performance ratings. Work performance (level of difficulty, quantity, completeness, proper timing) and work capacity (planning ability, contract ability, rapidity, integrity, faithfulness) are the basic indices of performance with a total score of 100; this rating system is administered two times a year. The experience rating comprises of public office and other (doctor degree, certificates, civil) experiences. This rating system is administered twice a year as well (on June 30 and December 31).

There are two types of promotions: regular promotion and special promotion. Performance (70~95%), experience (5~30%), and other additional points (less than 5 points) are added for all candidates to determine the total number of (100% + additional points) points. Most regular promotions are evaluated promotions. The promotion process up to level 5 consists of regular promotion exams or open competitive exams. Special promotions are awarded to outstanding performers. The performance management card system is used for public officers over level 4. It manages total evaluation and audit results to implement a human resource management system. The multifaceted evaluation system also aims to gain insight from civilians, co-workers, superior workers and subordinates.

Fourth, salary is managed by the salary step system. Thirty types of bonuses are given in total. Each employee’s salary is made up of family budget bonuses, special service/region bonuses, and overtime payments. However, for public officials over level 4, the annual salary system applies. Officials in political service receive fixed payments, while senior civil service and public officials over level 4 are paid based on their performance. Welfare is also available through the personnel welfare system, which offers sixteen types of welfare support including housing support, education loans, medical expenses, parental expenses and insurance (Performance-related payment Portal of MOPAS).

The pension system is based on a special occupational pension scheme for the career civil service. It operates based on two principles: one is the social insurance principle that requires the government and public officials to take equal responsibility, and the other is the support principle in case of a budget shortage. Either a single lump-sum payment or pension is given to retired government employees with over twenty years of service or those employees who retired early due to an injury or disease contracted at the workplace. MOPAS (Ministry of Public Administration and Security) manages the pension system for public officials, and the Government Employees Pension Corporation is responsible for salary payment, contribution collection liability amount, and welfare projects. The administration’s welfare system is made up of pensions, provisions for compensation in case of accidents, and retirement funds.
Last but not least, the status of Korean public officials is guaranteed: they may not be dismissed unless they are subjected to legal action. Leaves of absence are granted for up to three years in case of sickness, overseas study, and pregnancy, and the retirement age is sixty (Civil Service Act Art. 71 Art. 72 Art. 74). Employees should remain faithful to work hours and are required to keep all work-related material confidential (Civil Service Act Art. 58 Art. 60). Additionally, Korean public officials may not accept donations or treats, and cannot hold another job (Civil Service Act Art. 61 Art. 64). Finally, the officials must remain politically neutral and refrain from participating in political demonstrations (Civil Service Act Art. 65 & Art. 66).
Significance of Korean Career Civil Service System and Its Developmental Process

1. Theoretical Foundation for the Korean Career Civil Service System
2. Necessary Conditions for the Establishment of the Career Civil Service System: In the Korean Context
3. Developmental Process of the Korean Career Civil Service System
4. Summaries and Implications
1. Theoretical Foundation for the Korean Career Civil Service System

The rank-in-person and closed career systems provide the foundation on which the career civil service system is built. Officials are ranked into class structures based on specific qualifications in the rank-in-person system (Seok Hong Oh, 2009:76). This is a closed career, generalist, rank-in-person, status-guaranteeing system (Dong Suh Bak, 1984: 144~148; Min Bong Yu, 2010:92~96), similar to the career civil service system (Mosher, 1982:15~156; Sung Chul Kang et al, 2011:43).

The career civil service system is a personnel management system intended to recruit and retain outstanding young talents with a high sense of honor and integrity for public office. The modern career civil service system, which is merit-based, sets a qualification standard and age limit for new applicants. The eligible applicants’ abilities and achievements are then given consideration during the hiring process. The traditional form of this system is based on a generalist, rank-in-person, closed career system (Tae-Kwon Ha, 2002). However, a recent trend shows an increasing emphasis on the specialist aspect like that of the American position classification system. Adopting some characteristics of the open civil service system, the Korean career civil service system is beginning to redefine itself between the two traditional systems. It has become more flexible as a result, sometimes adopting the methods of the open civil service system to recruit special experts for specific projects. This change allows foreigners to be hired into privileged government positions. The Senior Civil Service is a result from this position classification system.

The rank-in-person system has a closed career system which operates under closed recruitment differentiated by rank. Countries adopting the rank-in-person system experience
large gaps in educational background based on the officials’ ranks. Promotion is difficult to attain in a rank system. In principle, if a public official is employed under a certain rank, he can only increase his ranking by one or two grades during his lifetime (Kang et al., 2011:207). In other words, the grades of public officials have already been determined upon their recruitment.

The Korean rank-in-person system is divided into grade five, grade seven and grade nine. It also has closed features within the rank system because promotion is limited to grade five. Public officials over grade five have the power to make public policy and to manage operations of lower-ranked officials, whereas public officials below grade six are in charge of policy implementation or civil complaints. Korea has also adopted a closed career system. Public officials recruited by the open competitive examination are appointed to the lowest grade. Promotion may only be attained from within the system; lateral entrance is not allowed (Jung, 1994: 4). Because of this characteristic, the closed career system is also called internal labor orientation (John Wiley & Sons, 2009). Such systems increase the morale and sense of unity among its officials, keeping the administration stable. On the other hand, if public officials are unaffected by the distraction of changing surroundings, they can become part of a privileged class. As few high-ranking public officials attain their statuses through education and ability, they can become elite bureaucrats responsible for creating significant public policy (Dong Suh Bak, 1984:147; Seok Hong Oh, 2009:54).

The rank-in-person system is also generalist, meaning that those who are recruited have broad, basic knowledge. This means that officials are able to handle tasks reflecting government views by accumulating more experience and knowledge. Generalists possess superior understanding, control, and ability of any given situation. Thus, the examinations focus on measuring this kind of knowledge to evaluate each individual’s potential (Sung Chul Kang et al, 2011:208).

The rank-in-person system guarantees public officials’ statuses as well. If a public official does not engage in corrupt activities, his status is guaranteed by law until he retires. If his position is lost by organizational reform, he will be appointed to a new position (You, 2010:96). This system contributes to maintaining the consistency of public administration regardless of the changes in government (Mosher, 1982:15~156; Sung Chul Kang et al, 2011:43).
2. Necessary Conditions for the Establishment of the Career Civil Service System: In the Korean Context

To establish a career civil service system, there are certain conditions that must be met. Many public administration scholars commonly recognize the following as prerequisites: high social evaluation of public service, recruitment of young persons, manpower development by education and training, appropriate compensation and pension system, and a long-term supply and demand plan for public officials (Dong Suh Bak, 1984; Joong Yang Kim, 1999:18~20; Joong Yang Kim & Myong Sik Kim, 2000:26~28; Sung Chul Kang et al., 2011:43~44). Applications in the Korean context are as follows.

First, high social evaluation of public service means that many people appreciate public officials for their contribution to national growth and development (Kang et al., 2011:44). In 2010, the Korean Institute of Public Administration found that when asked why they chose to work for the country, public officials responded with guarantee of status (33.75%), steady income (19.3%), a worthwhile career (17.2%), and social recognition (9.4%). 28.7% of the public officials surveyed said that their careers were worthwhile and highly recognized. 54.6% claimed that ‘their opinion about working in the public service for their children’ were ‘positive’ or ‘very positive’. Also, 22.8% said that they thought the benefits of their
jobs included the pride in ‘serving the people’ or ‘earning a high social reputation.’ Finally, competition in the civil service examination is over 40 to 1 in grade five, over 110 to 1 in grade seven, and 70~90 to 1 in grade nine. These high competition rates have continued for the past three years, and the following table shows that the public official has a very popular job.

Lee (2007) stated that society evaluates public officials favorably because of ‘respect for the officials and disrespect for the people’ and the ‘immaturity of private enterprises.’ However, he also notes that evaluation results were relatively lower in the past because of ‘perceived corruption among public officials,’ ‘public criticism’, and ‘growth of private enterprises.’

Table 2-1 | Competition Rate of Civil Service Examiniaion [09~12]  
(Unit: %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>grade 5</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>37.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>grade 7</td>
<td>79.9</td>
<td>115.4</td>
<td>122.7</td>
<td>108.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>grade 9</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>82.2</td>
<td>93.3</td>
<td>72.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Cyber State Exam Center, Ministry of the Public Administration and Security

Korean civil service system also seeks to recruit young people. By doing so, people come to regard public office as a lifetime career that can be advanced by merit. The government provides training for those recruited. The minimum age requirement for the Korean civil service examination is twenty years old for grades five and seven, and eighteen years old for grade nine. Maximum age limit was abolished on January 1st, 2009. Since the age limits were 20~32 years old for grade five, 20~35 years old in grade seven, and 18~32 years old in grade nine in the past, new public officials over the ages of 40~50 are currently on the rise (Cyber State Exam Center in Ministry of the Public Administration and Security).

The third condition is human resources development by education and training. The government provides a career development system for young public officials (Joong Yang Kim & Myong Sik Kim, 2000:27). The Ministry of Public Administration and Security (MOPAS) has operated the Career Development Plan (CDP) system since 2005. MOPAS also oversees the officials’ education and training. Each central administrative agency has an educational institution, as do all local governments. The education and training programs aim to introduce public officials to new types of knowledge and skills, improve job capability through research, further foreign language skills in a changing administrative environment, and to diversify administrative demand. These programs take place both domestically and abroad (Personnel Office in MOPAS).
The fourth condition is an appropriate compensation and pension system. To encourage long-term service of public officials, the government competes with private enterprises by building its own system of career and salary advancement. The government also operates a pension plan which assures a comfortable livelihood for retired public officials (Joong Yang Kim & Myong Sik Kim, 2000:27).

The compensation system for Korean public officials is composed of the salary step and annual pay systems. The salary step system is a seniority pay system which increases base pay through annual promotion (Portal for Performance and Compensation in MOPAS). The Korea Labor Institute found through a 2011 survey that the average salary for public officials was 85.2% of private sector salaries. Police officers had the highest percentage at 91.9%, public educational officials had 87.2%, and public officials in general service had 77.1% (Herald Economy 5. 24. 2012). Public officials’ salaries have been increasing steadily, and they are projected to increase by 2.8% in 2013 (Ministry of Strategy and Finance). MOPAS controls the pension system while the Government Employees Pension Service (GEPS) executes its policies. Pension system in the Korean public service was introduced in 1960. GEPS gives pensions to those employed for over twenty years in the case of disease, injury, retirement, resignation, or death. It executes a variety of payments, such as retirement payment, survivor’s benefit, retirement allowance, compensation for accidents in line of duty, and refund annuity (Personnel Office in MOPAS).

The last condition is a plan for long-term public official’s supply and demand. The Korean government has been executing a workforce plan for public officials in the Decree on the Appointment of Public Officials (clause 8 & 34) and the Decree on the Appointment Exam of Public Officials (clause 3 & 42) since late 2005. Each government authority has to establish a workforce plan including all its public officials’ recruitment, promotion and arrangement. The institution has to implement its public personnel policy plan in executing promotion and civil service examinations. MOPAS can support, control and evaluate the workforce plan of each government institution after necessary review. This plan is composed of a Two-year Concrete Action Plan within the larger frame of a Five-Year Plan.

3. Developmental Process of the Korean Career Civil Service System

The Korean Career Civil Service System has developed with the enactment of the National Public Service Act in August 1949. The system’s beginnings were rooted in the merit system, political neutrality of civil service, guarantee of the public official’s status, and equal opportunities for all regarding the civil service examination. However, in practice, it actually operated under a spoils system under the US Military government until the National
The Public Service Act was amended by the Third Republic in 1963. After the National Public Service Act was amended, the Korean Government attempted not only to reinforce its previous principle of open competitive examination, education, training, and guarantee of status system, but also to improve the compensation and pension systems. We can consider this period as the foundation of Korean Career Civil Service System’s development.

The Fourth Republic guaranteed priority appointment for all applicants who passed the open competitive examination. It established a standard for performance evaluation by making rules regarding bonuses and special promotions. It also provided public officials with two-year leaves of absence for their welfare. Specialized contracts with limited terms were introduced to offer positions requiring professional skills to the public.

The Fifth Republic established a system of promotion and appointment management based on performance, and reinforced the guarantee system of a public official’s status. The types of public officials were systemized, and their rank system was altered to that of a grade 1~9 system. It introduced a grievance procedure to assuage the dissatisfactions of public officials, and postponed retirement. The Sixth Republic established the Korean Career Civil Service System, furthering its growth by addressing the administration’s issues with diversification and specialization through the improvement of the special recruitment system.

The Kim Young-sam Administration (1993~1998) reinforced the performance evaluation (rating) system by awarding excellent public officials with bonuses and dismissing those with poor work records. It also granted maternity and housework leaves and extended leaves of absence for studying abroad to three years. Specialists in international relations or foreign language speakers were more actively recruited through special recruitment.

The Kim Dae-jung Administration (1998~2003) implemented public personnel reform by focusing on performance-related pay system and objective management system. This was a response to the newly-emerging global wave of neo-liberalism. It introduced the open position system and guaranteed maternity leave by changing the conservative atmosphere of its bureaucratic society.

The Roh Moo-hyun Administration (2003~2008) further developed the Korean Career Civil Service System by adding more elements in the position classification system. It increased the accessibility of public posts to women, handicapped, and local individuals by abolishing various types of discrimination. This government also built the Career Development Plan (CDP) system. It increased professionalism by relieving exclusivity, and improved the performance of the Korean Career Civil Service System by introducing the Senior Civil Service and broadening the open recruitment system. Performance-oriented evaluation systems were introduced, including the multifaceted evaluation system, job
performance agreement system, performance management card system for high ranking public officials of over grade four, and the performance evaluation system for junior-level public officials. The Roh Administration even approved Korean Government Employees’ Union, which, despite not having the right of collective action, extended public officials’ rights, along with other family-friendly service systems.

The career civil service system has several benefits. First, it reinforces public officials’ sense of unity and service. Second, it expects its officials to fulfill their duties in spite of disadvantages through strict discipline. Third, public officials are encouraged to maintain a compassionate relationship with the government (Seok Hong Oh, 2009:48). Fourth, longer-term services of public officials increase consistency and stability of the administration. Finally, because of extensive human resources development, public officials become more capable and efficient with high-quality training (Do Hyung Lee, 2007:69).

On the other hand, the career civil service system has its weaknesses (Yeon Ho Park, 2001:73; Seok Hong Oh, 2009:49). Insensitive officials may quickly turn their administration into a bureaucracy. Limitation in recruiting methods and strict rules about educational and age prerequisites are against the principles of democracy. Third, external specialists are difficult to hire into the middle of Korean public officials’ rank-in-person, hindering the growth of the Korean Career Civil Service System. Professionalism of government activity is difficult to improve because of the generalist, closed career system. The importance of position in the rank system also encourages officials’ cutthroat competition for promotions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Merits</th>
<th>Demerits</th>
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<tr>
<td>Establishment of public office as professional job</td>
<td>Conservatization and bureaucratization of public officials’ group</td>
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<tr>
<td>Keeping high-level public service spirit and standards of behavior</td>
<td>Recession of public office, capability deterioration of public officials</td>
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<tr>
<td>Advantage in fostering high-quality public officials</td>
<td>Complacency, bureaucracy pathology resistant to change</td>
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<tr>
<td>Keeping continuity, consistency and safety in public administration</td>
<td>Restricting promotion of specialized administrators and specialization of public administration</td>
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4. Summaries and Implications

Broadening the open career and position classification systems, as well as the development of the open competitive examinations, was integral to the development of the Korean Career Civil Service. Various changes were made on the reinforcement of performance evaluation, advancements in career development management and education & training system, and welfare provisions such as leaves of absence. As a result, the main elements of the Korean Career Civil Service System were reinforced; at the same time, however, policy-oriented modifications for the Korean Career Civil Service System came into focus (Seok Hong Oh, 2009:49).
Chapter 3

2012 Modularization of Korea's Development Experience
The Establishment of Career Civil Service System
in the Korean Government

Drawing on and Analyzing the Best Practices
of the Korean Cases

1. Drawing on and Analyzing the Best Practice:
   Based on Periods of Development

2. Drawing on and Analyzing the Best Practice:
   Based on Governmental Units

3. Drawing on and Analyzing the Best Practice:
   Based on Cooperative Governance
1. Drawing on and Analyzing the Best Practice: Based on the Periods of Development

In order to learn from the successful cases in the Korean career civil service system from 1960 to present, the study will examine the ones that have continued to develop up until the present, as well as those judged to be a success among the governmental personnel administrative system. By doing so, we hope to show the introduction and operation of systems that contributed to the establishment of Korean career civil service system, such as the public officials’ recruitment system, performance management including the education and training system, wages and pension system, job performance rating and promotion system, systems to protect the rights and interests of public officials including the guarantee of status, ethics of public service, and public officials’ workforce plan.

In 1961, the Park Chung-hee administration (also called the Third Republic) abolished the former spoils system and converted the qualifying examination into service examination for the employment system. The civil service examination was divided into two categories of “open competitive employment” and “special employment,” giving priority to applicants who passed the open employment exam. The same president under the Fourth Republic institutionalized recruitment examinations including the Civil Service Examination, the Higher Civil Service Examination, the Foreign Service Examination, the Technology Examination, a special promotion examination, an open competitive promotion examination, and a special recruitment examination for external hires. He also increased the efficiency of public officials by the suggestion plan and promotion through job performance and career ratings. The guarantee of public officials’ statuses was reinforced by banning the practice of advised resignations followed by rehiring of the dismissed officials affected by changes in
the organization. The Republic set up the Appeals Committee, enacted the Public Officials Pension Act in 1960 and actualized it in 1963, and legislated the accident compensation plan to protect the rights and interests of public officials. It also paid reasonable wages to officials or members of their families in case of disease, injury, retirement or death, announcing that the government should establish measures for the proper protection of its employees. In particular, the payment system was modified, continuing the plan in 1966 to increase the salary of public officials by 30% each year. Pension payments were increased as well. Finally, the administration bolstered the training system by enacting the Education and Training of Public Officials Act in 1973. The Secretary General was designated to plan and adjust the training system as needed by cooperating with other institutions, and every public official had to receive training to improve work-related knowledge, skills and capability. The training results were reflected favorably in subsequent personnel management, and the responsibility of training junior staff was given to senior officials (Dong Keuk Kim, 2012:53; Jung Yang Kim et al, 2000:6~8; Seung Bin Lim, 2000:43~44; Jong Young Song, 1987).

In 1981, the Chun Doo-hwan administration of the Fifth Republic divided the level system into “public officials in career service” and “public officials in special career service”, classifying them in nine grades. These classifications are in use today. “Public officials in career service” refers to those who are appointed in accordance to their performances and qualifications, have guaranteed statuses, and are expected to serve as public officials for life. “Public officials in special career service” are non-career officials who have been recruited using special standards or procedures. The guarantee of status was reinforced by preventing the officials’ dismissal except for unsatisfactory performance. The government also introduced the grievance procedure system in order to address the officials’ dissatisfaction or conflict over both personnel and personal matters. The central grievance review committee, managed by the appeals review committee, was established in the central personnel management agency. Ordinary grievance review committees were established in all appointment authorities. Reasonable standards were established for promotions: promotion to grades three or above should were made based on the officials’ abilities, careers, etc., while promotions up to grade five were made through examinations. The general promotion examination distinguished successful applicants by exam scores and rating marks on the list of potential candidates. There was also a special promotion for exceptional officials who continuously exercised fairness, displayed prominent abilities while performing their duties, achieved remarkable results, or died in the course of public service (Seung Bin Lim, 2000:46~50; Song, 1987).

In 1988, the Roh administration of the Sixth Republic established many systems protecting the rights and interests of public officials. The appeal review request period was
extended to thirty days after the initial request, and the restriction period for the appointment of a successor was also extended to forty days so that an official could return to his or her original position if the Appeals Committee canceled or nullified the dismissal. Decisions of the appeals review were classified into rejection, decline, cancellation or change, enhancing their objectivity. The requests of the grievance review system were heeded as well. The range of grievances were diversified from working conditions and personnel matters to overall organization and treatment, such as requiring that officials who requesting grievance reviews would not suffer disadvantages. Legal reformations mandated that the results of the reviews be followed up within reason and be notified to those who initially made the requests (Jung yang Kim et al, 2000:17~18).

The Kim Administration (1993~1998) institutionalized requiring public disclosure and registration of public officials’ assets by amending the Public Service Ethics Act, which stated that public officials over grade four were obligated to register their property with the government; those over grade one had to disclose their assets publicly. The range of property registration was expanded with the tax embezzlement case of the Buk-gu Office in September 1994. Those who registered their property increased from 34,000 in 1994 to 80,000 in 1995 (Ho Sick Kim et al, 1999: 315). Also, administrative litigation about administrative measures with personnel disadvantages had to pass screenings and judgment of the Appeals Commission, with consideration given to the accomplishment of the public official who made the initial request. Following this change, the relief rates of the Appeals Commission increased from just 29.2% in 1992 to 54.9% in 1993 (Ho Sick Kim et al, 1999:315). However, other public personnel reforms in the Kim Administration failed to accomplish their goals. This failure was caused by resistance, lack of understanding by public officials, and lack of preparation regarding the new systems. Management by Objectives System was not implemented, and the grade creep system for reducing personnel congestion caused harder performance evaluations of public officials, strengthening the mentality of the seniority system (Seung Bin Im, 2000:52~53).

The next Kim Administration (1998~2003) first introduced the open position system. This system was a recruiting system geared towards increasing the administrations’ professionalism and competitiveness by setting certain performance standards for public officials. Those recruited were appointed by contract service. The target positions were heads of a department or directors of a bureau of grade 1~3. Each government department could recruit contract services within a 20% range of all the head’s and director’s numbers combined, after conferring with the Central Personnel Committee. Subsequently, 129 open positions were created in 2000. The positions were distributed in the following proportion: 15% in grade one, 55% in grade two, and 30% in grade three. Open positions include the head (grade one) of the government reform office in the Ministry of Planning & Budget,
the economic coordinator (grade one) in the Office for Government Policy Coordination, the director of the personnel bureau in the Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs, and the director of the atomic energy bureau in the Ministry of Science and Technology. This system was bolstered by opening these crucial positions, and began with the open recruiting of the director of the National Museum in February 1992. 131 positions were designated, and the civilian recruiting rate was 20%. Even though the civilian recruiting rate was small via the open position system, public administration academics and civic groups evaluated this system favorably (Jung Kil Jung et al, 2000:180). Kung Keun Nam (2000) said that “The appointments of many public officials mean that they are all relatively competitive, and this system can increase professionalism by recruiting specialists fitted to the jobs’ characteristics.” He also stated that the system not only solved the problem of frequent job rotation but also changed personnel practices regarding the positions of high-ranking public officials (Kung Keun Nam, 2000).

Second, the Kim Administration (1998~2003) introduced annual pay system to high-ranking public officials over grade three. It was a performance-related system with pay differentiated by job performance. Its target public officials were those in political, general, special, and foreign affairs services over grade three. Public officials in political services were entitled to fixed annual incomes by position, while those in career and contract services over grade three were entitled to annual income based on job performance within the bounds of total annual income (Seung Bin Im, 2000:55; Chang Min Kang, 2002:10). Yeong Su Han (1999) discovered that through introduction of the annual pay system, we could expect positive effects such as revitalization of the organization due to a reinforced merit system, job incentives, recruitment & maintenance of an outstanding workforce, ease of remuneration management, promotion of the governance, and sense of communication between a superior and his subordinates.

Finally, the Kim Administration implemented the Management by Objective (MBO) System to reform the existing conventional merit rating systems in 1999. The MBO targets public officials in the general, special, and foreign affairs services over grade four, and evaluates them by calculating the individual total score through the evaluation of the unit goal. This organization is important for not only founding the absent evaluation system for public officials over grade four, but also improving administrative efficiency by introducing competition into the bureaucratic society. Evaluation results by the MBO were used in personnel management through promotions, special salary increases, performance-based bonuses, education & training, appointment management, and so on (Tae Bum Yoon, 2000:140~141; Seung Bin Im, 2000:56~57). Tae Bum Yoon(2000) evaluated the MBO as an innovative system in the way that it completely replaced the existing nominal merit rating system (simple description evaluation) after a year of careful preparation, However,
some insignificant results of the MBO in local governments showed that its systematic implementation focused too much on the process itself. Today, the MBO has developed a job performance agreement system.

The Roh Administration (2003~2008) first introduced the workforce plan system. The workforce plan secures and mobilizes the manpower necessary to achieve specific goals over a certain time period. The administration set up this system in the Decree on the Appointment of Public Official and the Decree on the Appointment Exam of Public Official at the end of 2005. Each government ministry had to establish workforce a plan including its officials’ recruitment, promotion, appointment, etc. They are also required to implement new appointment examinations and methods of promotion to grade five under this plan. Forty-three institutions (excluding the Office of the President and Minister for Special Affairs) were subject to this new system. The key points of the workforce plan include: establishment of a long-term goal (environmental analysis and estimation, vision and mission, main objective and strategy), analysis of the workforce’s present condition (magnitude and structure of workforce, personnel management such as recruitment, promotion and transference, required capability and possession capability), five-year workforce plan and goal, and two-year action plan (MOPAS). This plan plays a significant role in effectively allotting human resources to fulfill organizational goals (Yang Ho Ahn, 2009: 125). Through the mid-term workforce plan, the administration could effectively predict the direction of national policy and increase efficiency in personnel management by strategic personnel appointments. This system had some visible impacts. First, it improved the quality of education by hiring more teachers and shortening the waiting period for patent examinations from 22.6 months to 9.8 months. Second, it increased the arrest rates of maritime criminals and decreased processing time for the postal service through workforce reinforcement. The National Customer Satisfaction Rank of the postal service rose from 63rd in 2002 to 7th in 2006 (MGAHA, 2008).

The Roh administration (2003~2008) also introduced Senior Civil Service in 2006. This system emphasized performance by appointing capable department heads and bureau directors to office. The SES was made up of high-ranking public officials over grade 3, such as directors of administrative offices, as well as 1,500 others in general, special, and foreign affairs services. MGAHA abolished the rank system for officials over grade three and paid its employees based on their performance, significance of position, and difficulty of work through SES, which was comprised of 20% open positions, 30% job postings, and 50% autonomy personnel position in the ministry. It implemented a new job performance agreement system which evaluated the level of each public official’s work after agreeing to the job’s objectives and evaluation standards with the supervisor. As the officials are divided into grades 1~5, MGAHA established the public office qualification test for those
receiving the lowest grade for two consecutive years or three years overall (Personnel Office in MOPAS). The SES system spurred positive changes by laying down the groundwork for performance-oriented culture in Korean bureaucracy. For example, after the introduction of SES, section chiefs had to direct their efforts into developing their abilities in order to remain competitive in the field (Kyung Ho Cho et al, 2008:2; Yeong Ju Kwon et al, 2010:12). Kwon et al. (2010) concluded that the SES system kept the Korean Career Civil Service System politically neutral and guaranteed the status of high-ranking public officials by guaranteeing retirement age while identifying public officials who continuously performed poorly on qualification reviews.

Table 3-1 | Main Details of The Career Civil Service System

| Concept | Personnel management system promoting open and competition about high-ranking position, reinforcing public personnel management focused on job and performance, reinforcing verification system for selection and maintenance, raising professionalism of public administration, fostering whole governmental view |
| Composition | About 1,500 public officials of government ministries, head of a department and director of a bureau [general, special and contract service, foreign service officer] |
| Recruit and Entry | Open position within 20% limits, job posting within about 15% limits, institution autonomy position within 65% New entry method: Education & training about candidate, capability evaluation, personnel screen |
| Personnel Management | Class of duty: Ga-Na Class [Rank system of 1~3 grade is abolished] Job performance contract and remuneration is appropriated by class of duty. |
| Performance of Introduction | Spread of personnel management focused on job and performance, differential rates of pay, open and competitive about public office and so on. |

The Roh Administration improved personnel administration system for local public officials as well. The autonomous local public service system had performed unsatisfactorily since the first primary local election in 1995. This was due to ongoing spoils system and corruption within the local governments. Keys to reform included: improvement of the promotion system, introduction of open position and job posting system to encourage administrative openness, and establishment of the multifaceted rating system for increasing responsibility and fairness within local personnel committees. The Roh Administration combined decisions of local personnel committees and examination scores to promote officials to grade 5 in response to the rampant governmental corruption involved with such
promotions in 2002. Open position system for over grade 6 was expanded to encourage local governmental openness. The job posting system was also introduced in order to recruit eligible public officials to work in all levels of government. The Roh Administration even established pre-announcement and multifaceted rating systems to ensure fairness in the local personnel administration. It also minimized rewards and vindictive decisions following local election results. It implemented a new performance evaluation system based on the multifaceted evaluation to promote certain officials. The local personnel committees were enlarged from 5~7 members to 7~9 members in order to more efficient exercise of authority over local governments’ personnel affairs. Prerequisites for appointing external examiners were reinforced. Sections of the performance rating system were also weighted differently, increasing from 50% to 70% for job performance and decreasing from 30% and 20% to 20% and 10% for career and training performance. Increasing the significance of job performance set the foundation for local performance management. Through these improvements, the Roh Administration strengthened not only control and supervision but also autonomy of the local personnel system at the same time. The local organizations’ self-regulating control (i.e. local personnel committees) was important as well (MGAHA, 2008:474~478).

President Roh Moo-hyun also implemented an innovative human resource system of representative government by encouraging social equity. More people were recruited across social boundaries in order to further the nation’s unity and competitiveness (The Central Personnel Committee, 2006; Chun Oh Park et al. 2010: 35). In this newly targeted group of new hires were women, the handicapped, local residents, and talented individuals in engineering and the natural sciences. Components of active measures include debt, placement, assignment, efficiency and promotion, and training/education (Kyung Deuk Kwon et al, 2005:29). First of all, the Gender Equity Employment Quota System was established to recruit more women. This system states that when there are less than 30% of successful candidates of any one sex, more officials of the same sex can be employed. Through this system, the number of female employees in the technological field increased. After Roh Moo-hyun’s administration, the percentage of female civil servants increased from 34% in 2003 to 40.1% in 2007 (internal data of MOPAS, 2010). The number of female directors over level 5 also increased through “The five-year spread plan of female administrator appointments” (2002~2006). Guidelines for equal opportunity recruitment were established, an alternative human resource system was implemented, and standards for maternity leave were improved to create a family-friendly work atmosphere. For those with disabilities, “The comprehensive plan for 3% achievement, the obligation employment rate for disabled people, central administrative agency” was established in February 2009. Quotas for recruiting handicapped officials were set annually, increasing the percentage of such employees from 5% to 6.5%. The number of handicapped employees in the government
Chapter 3. Drawing on and Analyzing the Best Practices of the Korean Cases

subsequently grew from 5,421 in 2003 to 12,219 in 2006 (Presidential Committee on Government Innovation & Decentralization, 2007; Chun Oh Park et al., 2010: 39). Overall number of hired employees increased as well. Korea increased the number of employees in level 4 across the board by establishing "The five-year spread plan of technical post and natural science & engineering appointment over grade four" (2004~2008). New hires in the natural sciences and engineering fields rose from 28.9% in 2004 to 32.3% in 2007 (MOPAS, 2010). An annual plan was also implemented in order to raise the employment rate of level 5 technical positions to 40%. The technical examination and Civil Service Examination were combined into one under "Civil Service Examination", and more officials specializing in science and technology were employed each year since 2004 (Chun Oh Park et al, 2010:41). Finally, more talented people from local provinces were recruited through the “local talented person recommendation recruitment” and “local talented person recruitment target system.” The former system was for university graduates or prospective graduates with outstanding grades (high rank 5%) with certain language abilities (TOEIC 775, TEPS 700, TOEFL 83, etc.). A recommendation from the school principal, appropriate documentation, PSAT results, and an interview were required for students to become level 6 civil officers after three years of apprenticeship. The emphasis on grades, though, has been relaxed to 10%, who can be employed in level 7 after just one year of apprenticeship. Furthermore, successful candidates from metropolitan areas are limited to 10% of all hires so that outstanding candidates from different parts of the country can be employed as well (Recommendation manual for grade seven trainees of MOPAS). The other channel, the local talented person recruitment target system, has been operating for five years since 2007, increasing opportunities for applicants in all regions. This system is intended for people who have graduated, dropped out, enrolled, or taken a leave of absence from school. This system states that if successful candidates of level 5 from local schools make up less than 20% of everyone hired, more individuals from local provinces can be employed until the target number is reached (The balance personnel guidance of MOPAS). Chun Oh Park et al. (2010) evaluated this equity-based recruitment policy as the most successful reform in Korea, continuously producing excellent results during the Roh Moo-hyun Administration.

Finally, the Roh Administration actively exchanged personnel between central and local governments. This exchange influenced the expansion of the Korean Career Civil Service System as well as the development of a cooperative system between the two levels of government. It also combined the strengths of each government (the policy planning capability of the central government and the practical experience of the local government) by building close human networks between the two, creating a synergy effect. The target individuals of personnel exchange are public officials of grade 3~7 under the age of fifty-three. The individuals all work in central administrative agencies or the sixteen municipalities. Personnel exchange is necessary for policy cooperation and high execution correlation.
between central and local governments. The location of duty was decided after considering individual wishes and government interests of distributing human resources. Under the Roh Administration, this exchange spanned 42 positions and 84 workers in 2004, 51 positions and 102 workers in 2005, and 53 positions and 106 workers in 2006. The Gyeonggi Province had the highest record of 68 people, while Gyeongbuk province and Incheon city had 30 and 28 people respectively in July 2007. This exchange of personnel was said to strengthen the capabilities of local decentralization, forging cooperative relations between central and local governments, developing professionalism, and affording unique experiences to the selected individuals (MGAHA, 2008: 486~491). Yeo Jin Kang et al. (2008) found that 82% of the public official respondents recognized the necessity of personnel exchange, as it maximizes the synergy effect of the administration and develops human networks and wide understanding between central and local governments. Also, 75.6% of participating public officials and 77.78% of those returning from the exchange claimed that they would like to continue their involvement in the program (Yeo Jin Kang et al, 2008).

The Lee Myung-bak Administration kept the policies of the Roh Administration in place, reinforcing the autonomy of personnel management, evaluating the accomplishments of officials over level 4, and improving the treatment of its officials (2003~2008). It relaxed certain personnel regulations such as unnecessary proceedings of approvals and notices, and increased ministers’ authority over departmental personnel management and post evaluations. The previous promotion procedures for level 3 officials took six steps over two or three weeks, but they were reduced to only three steps over one week. Forty-four outdated regulations were abolished by the end of 2007, and only twelve new ones were created by June 30th, 2008. The Ministry of Public Administration and Security published personnel manual and guidebooks in order to mitigate the difficulties in personnel management resulting from fewer regulations (MOPAS, 2008:76~83). The Lee Myung-bak Administration also reinforced performance evaluations of high-ranking officials over level 4, adopting the evaluation system for management officials. It originally used the absolute evaluation system with five levels (superior, excellent, normal, unsatisfactory, and insufficient) for evaluating the performance of high-ranking officials, but later introduced relative evaluation factors in February 2009 in response to the increasingly paternalistic administrative culture. It established appropriate values for the highest level of ‘superior,’ as well as for the two lower levels of ‘unsatisfactory’ and ‘insufficient.’ According to a survey conducted by the Ministry of Public Administration and Security, the hospitality quotient was reduced from 17.81 in 2006 to 12.23 in 2009; the number of subjects receiving ‘unsatisfactory’ or ‘insufficient’ increased from 10 in 2006 to 120 in 2009. Therefore, the tendency to give lenient evaluations was effectively curtailed. It also reinforced regular screening tests for high-ranking officials every five years, and developed the ‘customized level-up’ process for those who failed to pass the examinations. The improvement of evaluation system for
high-ranking officials spurred competition in work performance, positively affecting the officials’ abilities (MOPAS, 2010:100~102). In the past, inadequate evaluation systems for management officials allowed such officials to be promoted based on seniority. The new evaluation system developed six common standards for each management level (policy planning, performance management, organization management, communication, interest modification, motivation), and designed better evaluation techniques (1:1 role playing, announcement, group discussion, document management). The Ministry of Public Administration and Security implemented this system for Customs Administration, Patent Administration, and Rural Development Administration in November 2010. It made an effort to further develop this system by performing a proxy evaluation of 221 candidates in fourteen departments between July and December 2010 (MOPAS, 2010:102~105).

2. Drawing on and Analyzing the Best Practice: Based on Governmental Units

2.1. Best Practice of Government Ministries


The Rural Development Administration (RDA) managed employment inefficiently in the 17th presidential transition committee. As a result, the Lee Myung-bak Administration and Director Lee Soo-Hwa implemented the greatest personnel reform ever conceived. First, jobs related to research, teaching, administration, and agriculture in the Senior Civil Service were pluralized in all headquarters and in half of all affiliated organizations. In levels 4 and 5, all positions in the headquarters and 10% of the nine affiliated organizations were pluralized. This reform was intended to employ people based on their abilities, as well as to hire those from outside the organization. Next, competency evaluations were implemented for assignments and promotions from June to July 2008. 2031 employees (except those who were already assigned) were subject to multifaceted evaluations. As a result, the bottom 5% were dispatched to agriculture field technology support groups, while the next 5% were warned to improve their performance. The process for normal employees was done in four steps: evaluation of managing ability, multifaceted evaluation, and verification of the rank list’s validity by the Examination Committee (Chief, General Manager-Chairman, and Section Chief-Member) of each organization, and decision through the personnel committee of the headquarters.

Additionally, salary increase for researchers with deficient performances was limited to 20%. Researchers and senior technical advisers were promoted according to the results of ability evaluations, multifaceted evaluations, and other traditional evaluation methods. The
The Establishment of Career Civil Service System in the Korean Government

Korean Society for Public Personnel Administration (2008. 7. 24) also added an external eligibility evaluation for section chiefs and candidates. As a result, four of the section chiefs were dismissed while eighteen were transferred. Members of RDA responded favorably to these strict personnel reforms. Despite some disagreements in individual task evaluation, other evaluations, such as eliminating barriers across different units, expansion of dual positions, section chiefs’ ability evaluation, and evaluation of planning ability, were changes that have been viewed in a positive light overall (Kyung Ho Cho, 2008).

Retrenchment of successful applicant appointment of grade 7–9 in open recruitment examinations in the Ministry of Public Administration and Security: Raising Appointment Stability of Open Recruitment Successful Candidate

Appointment of successful applicants of grade 7-9 was previously only possible in case of vacancy, requiring applicants to be “on call” for long periods of time. The Ministry of Public Administration and Security ameliorated this situation by curtailing the average waiting period from a year and a half to one year after passing the examination, requiring affiliated ministers to appoint new officials if no special reasons for additional training or postponement of appointment was present. By negotiating with individuals who had waited for a long time to be appointed, various ideas were advanced to change the system. A method for appointing officials was finally established (Outstanding Example of Improvement of Administration System from MOPAS, 2009).

2.2. Best Practice of Local Government

Seoul Metropolitan City, Improvement of the Education and Training System (2006~2007): Improvement of Education & Training System

Improvement of Seoul’s Education and Training System has taken place since the second half of 2006. The division between education and training proved to be the most serious problem: all educational organizations were severed from one another, and there was a lack of professionalism in managing the education and training system. The amount invested towards education and training was also very low. Therefore, the Department of Human Resources took complete responsibility for planning the education and training system. The education center, responsible for part of the planning, was renamed as the Seoul Human Resource Development Center. Educational programs for those in charge of education and training were implemented through civil educators and education technologists in specified departments (those responsible for developing the education process and founding academies for creative management). Necessary equipment and facilities were also obtained for the management of the new education program. Small classrooms were set aside for task discussion according to the new education and training system, and new
buildings were erected in order to hold them. The future budget until the year 2010 in Seoul was estimated to be 111,700 million won (KRW). Workers were also divided according to their specific abilities in leadership, professionalism and global perspectives. Education and training programs were developed with the difference of abilities in mind. The results of this improved system were recorded in the Human Resource Database and reflected in various areas such as employment. Short-term employment plans were altered to stress career development over a longer time period. Education for new employees became the norm, with the rate of cyber-education estimated to be at 70% in the year 2010. Finally, a new evaluation system including attitude change, work performance and resulting level of contribution, a constant learning system evaluating future career plans, and individual studying hours was implemented (Seoul, 2007; Kwoi Yeoung Kim, 2009). Kim (2009) claimed that these improvements in Seoul’s education and training system could be applied to other governments with meaningful directives.


In 2003, Jeollanam-do employed seven alternates who either had administrative experience or had retired to close the task gap resulting from extended maternity leave, which rose from 60 days to 90 days. The seven alternates were paid 23,940 won daily and fifteen million won (KRW) as a personnel cost. The administration created a family-friendly public service culture and promoted a lively atmosphere through the extended maternity leave. This change reduced the stigma of working with female public officials, who made up 10.8% of the workforce, by changing the conservative perspective of maternity leaves (Outstanding Example of Improvement of Administration System from MGAHA, 2003).

Incheon Metropolitan City, Vitalization of Specialized Education Course for Foreign Languages (2004): Reinforcement of Education & Training

The Vitalization of Specialized Education Course for Foreign Languages in Incheon, implemented from 2002 to 2004 (Sang Soo Ahn mayor era), was elected as an outstanding example of joint evaluation for the improvement of the administration system by the Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs in 2004. Incheon’s administration designated the city as a Free Economic Zone, furthered its officials’ foreign language skills and improved civil servants’ abilities to establish global city infrastructures as necessary. The Specialized Education course for Foreign Languages was provided in English, Chinese and Japanese; 390 officers completed normal and elite courses in three years. Fifty-one people in 2002, 124 in 2003, and 215 in 2004 completed the course. Two to three weeks of overseas training was implemented in each course. After three years of operation, it received approval from the Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs in 2005. The
establishment of career civil service system in the Korean government

Educational period for the originally approved quota of fifty people (English 20, Chinese 15, and Japanese 15) was extended to ten months, and targeted those in regular government service of level 6 or 7. These results were shown through enhanced work performance, with a new policy requiring each person to know at least one foreign language (Outstanding Example of Improvement of Administration System from MGAHA, 2004).

Seoul Metropolitan City, Operation of Education for reserved executives (2005): Reinforcement of Education & Training

University of Seoul administered education programs for civil servants of level 6-7 with more than ten years’ work experience for forty-four weeks from February to December 2005 (Lee Myung-bak Administration). This program was implemented in order to develop the potentials of selected civil servants, and to break away from the tradition of educating only senior management workers above level 5. Participants chose customized subjects such as real estate auctions, psychology, engineering and building mechanical facilities, baking, certificates, languages, and other hobbies, and a joint evaluation was undertaken after the submission of results. The educational effects were maximized since the subjects were chosen by the students themselves. By asking the participants to select and manage the subjects to study on their own, this program developed self-management and a results-based approach in all public officials (Outstanding Example of Improvement of Administration System from MGAHA, 2005).

Busan Metropolitan City, Operation of human resource affairs guide (2005): Managing E-HRM, Improvement of Working Conditions and Treatment

Busan managed its human resource affairs were managed in reasonable and fair manner. During the first half of the year (February) and second half of the year (July), when personnel transfers take place, the complaints of employees were also addressed through the shortcut site of the Human Resource Guide, an electronic document system. The complaints included individual concerns such as infant care, health, chores, commute, human relationship issues, supporting elderly parents, assignment problems regarding aptitude or ability development, and open call to employees for their preferred departments. This system supported reliable human resource administration and extended employee options by disclosing the administration and employee complaints to the public. It was also an advantageous system to manage assignments reflecting individual aptitude and personal wishes by developing a bottom-up human resource management (Outstanding Example of Improvement of Administration System from MGAHA, 2005).

Chungcheongbuk-do Province introduced the partnership personnel administration system for effective distribution of human resources. This system focused on teamwork. First, a department head would recommend someone he would like as a member of the team up to three times. Next, public officials below grade 6 would apply for their desired positions up to five times. Finally, the personnel department would appoint selected applicants to their desired positions and departments after reviewing their applications for capability and professionalism. Human resource data, including the personnel application contents, were added to the Database. The personnel department aimed to utilize the Database in the recruitment and appointment process. Chungbuk province attempted to maximize individual capability in the workforce and increase its administration’s competitiveness by utilizing this system. It appointed 188 applicants to partnerships (82 persons) and their desired positions (106 persons) in 2005. The implementation of this system contributed to building a fair, transparent personnel administration system. It also increased the officials’ efficiency by creating a teamwork-oriented organization with good communication among its members (Outstanding Example of Improvement of Administration System from MGAHA, 2005).

Gyeongsangbuk-do Province, Setting up 「The Personnel Helper」 and Improvement of Performance Rating System (2005): Managing E-HRM, Improving Encouragement Through Improvement of Treatment, Position management and Promotion System

Gyeongsangbuk-do Province introduced 「The Personnel Helper」 system using the Internet. This system aimed to listen to the complaints of public officials such as personnel problems, provision of personnel information, transference, and personnel exchange. The province also set up the interdepartmental performance standard rating distribution ratio, shifting the existing personnel administration system’s focus to capability and performance. It implemented multifaceted evaluations (comprising 30% of the promotion evaluation process), pre-announcement of personnel standards, rotation transference of a long-term employee over four years in same department, and expansion of main positions. Through these methods, the Gyeongbuk province increased the organizational productivity and morale of its public officials along boosting the competitiveness of its administration (Outstanding Example of Improvement of Administration System from MGAHA, 2005).
3. Drawing on and Analyzing the Best Practice: Based on Cooperative Governance

The Kim Dae-jung Administration’s Contracting-out Education and Training (2000): Reinforcement of Education & Training

The Kim Administration drastically expanded contracting-out of education and training for professional public officials, who needed to meet administrative needs by becoming more advanced and diverse. Domestic contracting-out education and training in 2000 selected 4,058 people (an increase of 1,392 people compared to the previous year) and provided a variety of education & training such as graduate courses and foreign language education courses. 401 people completed masters and doctoral courses domestically, with 56 people in the ministry and the other 345 people in 27 universities and 29 graduate schools. A short special course was completed by 113 people in seven universities and fourteen graduate schools. 2,529 officers completed foreign language courses in Hankuk University of Foreign Studies as well. Overseas contracting-out education and training in 2000 was completed by 1,410 people, an increase of 625 people compared to the previous year. The Kim administration bolstered two-week mass training programs in order to reduce mediocrity and inadequacy among its public officials. It provided foreign language education to 1,837 public officials in Daejeon Government Complex area in 2000 by establishing a new foreign language contracting-out education course in the language research institute of Chungnam National University. Contracting out education and training in this way increased the competitiveness of public service by developing public officials’ skills and attracting outstanding individuals into the field. The government ministry could even negotiate with foreign powers due to the rise in trained personnel (MGAHA, 2000: 36~38).

The Kim Administration’s Private and Public Joint ‘Public Officials’ Payment Actualization Five-Year Plan.: Rationalization of Compensation

From 2000 to 2004, the Kim Administration established the ‘Public Officials’ Payment Actualization Five-Year Plan to match public officials’ salary with that of someone of middle standing working for a private enterprise. It introduced flexible coordination of payment increasing period. It also investigated private and public salaries in order to decide on a treatment improvement ratio, and organized a joint ‘Payment Improvement Committee’ in order to gather opinions of experts in various fields. According to the Korean Labor Institute in June 2000, public officials’ salaries were 88.4% of those earned by workers in the private industry. The payment actualization plan took into consideration the payment coordination reserve fund secured already in 2000 and 2001, and attempted to set a 1.5~1.6% increase to close the gap between private and public salaries gradually after 2002. With this plan,
the government increased base pay by factoring in common extra payments into base pay, and changed the payment structure while merging similar extra payments. Public officials’ salaries, as a result, reached 95.9% of private salaries in 2004 (National Archives of Korea, ‘Public Officials Payment Actualization Five-Year Plan’ in 2006).

The Gyeongsangnam-do Province, Expansion of Graduate School Master’s and Doctoral course Contracting-Out: Improvement of Education & Training Systems

The Gyeongsangnam-do Province selected about 100 trainees in Masters and Doctoral courses for the annual improvement of administrative professionalism since 2005. It provided about one million won per semester to public officials in main provincial offices and institutes. The trainees were selected through the selection process of the provincial coordination committee each year after meeting detailed requirements and qualifications. The province supervised selected trainees’ academic affairs. Results were obtained primarily through the individual research plan. The Gyeongsangnam-do Province found that it could apply the results of research to practical business and contribute to the training of talented public officials through support programs of customized human resources development (Outstanding Example of Improvement of Administration System from MGAHA, 2005).

The Roh Administration’s Education and Training System: Innovation for local public officials through cooperation between private and public and universities (2004~2005): Improvement of Education & Training Systems

The Roh Administration revolutionized the education and training system for local public officials. The local personnel administration needed to be reformed due to the inadequacy of response to the variety of local needs, the necessity of greater investments in human capital, and the exclusivity of local personnel after the beginning of local autonomy. To solve this problem, MGAHA attempted to diversify the education and training system by sharing responsibility with private and public and universities. It organized the ‘innovation study group for local public officials’ education and training’ with eleven private and public specialists from July 2004 to February 2005, researching various possibilities for innovating local public officials’ education and training programs. MGAHA also sought opinions from consultations and seven other excellent education & training institutions such as the Samsung Human Resources Development Institute and the CJ Human Resources Development Institute in September 2004. After two meetings with the decentralization expert committee, the result was introduced to various types of education and training techniques and ways to maintain both competitive and cooperative relations with private educational institutes. This plan set the stage for future innovative measures in December 2012, which were applied to local governments as well. Some concrete methods implemented included reforms in the education and training system, the establishment of
a continuous learning system, and development of a local education and training plan, and the increased investments in long-term education and training. Through the participation of private institutions, local governments and specialists, MGAHA was able to develop such measures and bonds between various organizations. It selected outstanding models of local education and training from Kangdong-gu, Yeongdeungpo-gu, Jangsung-gun, Seochun-gun for setting a common standard between governmental institutions and private enterprises (MGAHA, 2008:479~485).

The Roh Administration’s Personnel Mobility Program between Government and Private companies: Improvement of Working Conditions

The Personnel Mobility Program between Government and Private Companies cultivated individual ability by introducing techniques for effective job performance and management from the private sector. The private corporations involved in this program were domestic corporations, and were strictly limited to public service-related organizations and private companies with close ties (Established Rule 118 of the Central Personnel Committee). Qualifications included limited employment history over three years, a rank greater than grade 4 or 5, and forty-five years of age or less. There were 96 people and 22 government ministries operating under this system in 2006. Specifically, there were 18 officers in the Fair Trade commission, 12 in the Ministry of Information and Communication, and 9 in the Ministry of Finance and Economy. The government ministries had a strong impact on industry policy and the regulation of private enterprise (Jae Ho Lee, 2008:64). Jae Ho Lee (2008:84) stated that although policy connection was frequently misunderstood as a mutualistic alliance between public officials and private companies, such incidences happened only in exceptional cases and that the program improved understanding and policy cooperation between the public and private sectors. He also claimed that the program revitalized the organization, individual motivation, and career development of public officials.

The Lee Administration’s Private and Public Joint Deliberative Committee of the Public Officials’ Pay: Rationalization of Compensation

In April 2010, the Lee Administration deliberated in a committee on the treatment improvement plan, payment level control, ways to balance payment between types and occupational groups, and ways to improve the payment system for public officials. There were seventeen members in the committee, composed of fourteen nongovernmental delegates, one chairman, and three government delegates. The nongovernmental delegates were selected upon consideration of diversity and the ripple effect in the private sector. The governmental delegates ranged from Head of the Personnel Office, Director of the Local Administration Bureau in MOPAS, and Head of Management and Unions Policy Office of
MEL (Ministry of Employment and Labor). Of the fourteen nongovernmental delegates, three members were from the Korean Employers Federation, the Korean Federation of Small and Medium Businesses, and a large company respectively, and three individuals were selected upon recommendation from specialists and the public officials’ union. Three were from the Korea Development Institute, Korea Labor Institute and Samsung Economic Research Institute, two were journalists, and the final three were professors in the fields of business administration and public personnel administration. In July 2010, the committee discussed the improvement of public officials’ treatment through private wage increases, the inflation rate, and the rate of economic growth. In accordance with this discussion, the payment rate of public officials in 2011 was finally decided at 6.3% (White Book of MOPAS, 2010: 126~129).
Difficulties and Lessons in Implementing the Korean Career Civil Service System

1. Difficulties and Problems in Implementing the Korean Career Civil Service System

2. Lessons
1. Difficulties and Problems in Implementing the Korean Career Civil Service System

This paper will examine the implementation process of the Korean Career Civil Service System during its introduction, development, improvement, and maturity. The system was first introduced during the period between the Lee Administration in 1949 to the Park Administration (the Fourth Republic) in 1979. The first National Public Service Act outlines the Korean Career Civil Service System by emphasizing merit-based system and guaranteeing public official’s status. However, the first Korean Government experienced difficulties during the introduction process because of the spoils system that continued until the Park Administration in 1961. Through widespread reform of the public personnel administration in 1961, the Korean Career Civil Service System began to stress the importance of open competitive examinations, status guarantees, education and training, sufficient pay, and a generous pension system for the very first time. During the Fourth Republic, the basic framework of the Korean Career Civil Service System rested upon recruiting successful applicants from open competitive examinations and improving promotion and leave of absence systems.

The system continued to develop in the period spanning the Fifth Republic (the Chun Administration) to the Kim Young-sam Administration (1993~1998). The Chun Administration altered the types and class names of public officials. It also made an effort to establish a promotion and position management system based on merit and to improve the working conditions of public officials. The next Roh Administration (1988~1993) extended retirement age and guaranteed officials’ statuses. The Kim Young-sam Administration (1993~1998) established the motivation (incentive) system of career service by granting
child-care leave and creating a system of performance-related pay for high-performing public officials. During this period, the Korean Career Civil Service System was founded and developed institutionally by the creation of the motivation (incentive) policy, improvement of working conditions, guarantee of status, and advancement of the rank-in-person and job management systems.

The improvement took place starting from the Kim Dae-jung Administration (1998~2003) to the Roh Administration (2003~2008). During this period, Korean Career Civil Service System was influenced significantly by a newly emerging wave of neo-liberalism. The Kim Dae-jung Administration (1998~2003) introduced the open position system and shifted the focus of public personnel system to immediate tasks rather than the ranking system. The Kim Administration introduced performance evaluation for both low and high-ranking government officials. On the other hand, as service needs became increasingly complex and diverse, the level of task demand increased. Accordingly, public officials’ training system was improved as well. Public officials received greater compensation for their work, and enjoyed higher-quality working conditions. This period of improvement was brought about by the Korean Career Civil Service System’s new emphasis on performance and the open system.

Korean Career Civil Service System has been settling in since 2008. The Lee Myung-bak Administration (2008~the present) vastly improved the treatment of public officials, strengthened performance management system, representative bureaucratic recruitment, and personnel administration. This system has maintained and developed the administration reforms put into place by the Roh Administration (2003~2008). After the Lee Administration (2008~the present), Korean Career Civil Service System’s new look can be summarized as follows. The system practices affirmative personnel policy, stresses performance management, values the internal & external education and training system, has a senior civil service system, and exchanges personnel between the central and local governments.

The following details the difficulties faced by Korean career civil servant system from its early beginning to the present state.

The first was the presence of discrimination throughout the organization, as evidenced by the lack of fair recruitment opportunities through affirmative action. It was also difficult to counter criticisms such as reverse discrimination and weakened meritocracy against affirmative action (Kyung Deuk Kwon et al., 2005; Chun Oh Park et al., 2010). The “Five-year plan of expanding the appointment of the female administrators” set an unrealistic target and failed to consider the nature of each department, which was a grave mistake, especially since each department felt pressured to meet the target ratio of female administrators. The departments subsequently refrained from cooperating actively with the
The effectiveness of this reform was also limited by the “glass ceiling” or “glass wall” phenomenon. Finally, “the local talent selection program” faced setbacks from the vague definition of “local talent” and the possibility of reverse discrimination against the college graduates who had attended universities in Seoul (Chun Oh Park et al., 2010: 50~52).

There were also various difficulties in the introduction of the performance-based public personnel administration system. Jaerok Oh (2009) pointed out both the theoretical and practical limitations of such a system. He presented theoretical difficulties in quantifying the results, rendering effective evaluations impossible. This problem is due to the fact that the consequences from government activities result from different situations and time variables, as well as input factors. Since unexpected results often appear, it would be almost impossible to control for all variables to accomplish the original performance goal. Measuring the results would also be problematic. Reaching a consensus regarding one goal is difficult, and it also necessitates the comparison of the government’s functions, projects, and activities — all factors that cannot be compared within the standardized criteria. Additionally, the performance evaluation requires efficiency and management capacity evaluation from the administrative aspect and an effectiveness evaluation from the political aspect. However, a consistent effectiveness evaluation is almost impossible because it would inevitably include the political area. Coupled with the dilemmas faced by the assessing institutions, evaluation of public officials is fairly difficult and complicated (Jaerok Oh, 2009: 289). From the practical perspective, the open position system failed to accomplish its performance goals since it opened certain positions without empowering personnel affairs and budget. Even when experts from the private sector were appointed as administrators in the government ministries, they were unable to exercise significant influence because of the exclusiveness in the existing bureaucracy. It was difficult to gather support of or to build a network with their bosses and junior staff members. Such points are side effects of introducing the performance management system superficially (Jaerok Oh, 2009:292). Jaerok Oh (2009: 283), upon analysis of the performance-related pay system of public teachers, cited examples of distortion when the teachers gathered the bonuses they earned and distributed them equally. According to Chae et al. (2006), a survey of public officials on the job performance agreement system showed that the main obstacles to the successful introduction of the system are repulsion and weariness towards the evaluation process (14.41%), excessive obsession over grading and monetary compensation (11.02%), and skepticism about the effectiveness of innovation (10.17%). The respondents also pointed out problems with the way evaluation indicators are weighted (9.32%), and losing concentration due to frequent changes in the organization and its positions (8.47%).

Third, the senior civil service system has its own share of problems as well, despite its purpose of developing professional competency and improving the performance of senior
public officials. From the initial stage, there were doubts about the short-term stability of this system after its establishment because of the hierarchical culture and exclusiveness of the Korean civil service system. Ha et al. (2007) cites specific issues, such as the competition for position, unfairness in grading and job evaluating, difficulties in matching officials’ abilities to their positions, limitations in personnel management due to the compulsory ratio of the open position, weakening sense of belonging, and discrimination. According to Kim (2009), a survey on the senior civil service system found that designing and operating the open contest system, as well as the propriety of pre-qualification and performance evaluation system, were rated low by public officials. Experts from the private sector responded negatively to the classification of jobs, qualification evaluations, acceptance of the senior civil service system, and the expansion of the open system. These results show that the private experts are struggling to adapt to the hierarchical public offices that are expanding as open positions, and that they are raising questions about the current position contest system and the propriety of the models and evaluation systems in the senior civil service.

Fourth, difficulties lie in the personnel exchange between central and local governments. Researchers cited a lack of incentive to the exchanged officials, a “central government-oriented” personnel practice, disadvantages to the newly-returned staff members, exclusiveness of the existing organization, exclusion of competent members from the exchange, lack of cooperation from the local governments’ chiefs, lack of understanding of the exchange system, and differences in job specifications among the various problems (Pan Seok Kim et al, 2001; Yeo Jin Kang et al, 2008; Kyung Deuk Kwon et al, 2009; Kwui Hui Bae, 2010; Jung Hwan Bae et al., 2011). Officials in central government chose exclusiveness of the local government organization, disadvantages in personnel affairs, and difference in job specifications as factors for failure, whereas local government officials determined that central government-oriented personnel practice, exclusiveness of central government organization, and deteriorating working conditions to be the biggest issues. These conclusions have been shown in empirical research since the early 2000’s, which indicate that these chronic problems have yet to be resolved. Although the exclusivity of organizations and disadvantages in personnel affairs have continued since the early 2000’s, recent studies show that the lack of incentive for the exchanged public officials is the most serious problem (Kwui Hui Bae, 2010; Jung Hwan Bae et al, 2011).

Fifth, there are problems concerning education and training for public officials. As pointed out by Park Jong-Deuk (2012: 264), the general criticisms on the current education and training system include: narrow focus on educational institutions, lack of conformity and expertise, irrationality of training functions, and lack of connectivity between the education, training, and the personnel management systems. Kim Pan-Suk (2007)
emphasized the need for improvement in the public officials’ capacity, as the government fell into ‘capacity deficit’, a state in which the government could not adequately handle the complexity of disputes that arose due to the shift in the paradigm of public administration. He argued that the governmental system assign authorities to proper positions in order to resolve disputes, and that the individual public officials should enhance their own problem-solving skills as well. Furthermore, Kim pointed out that the training expense per capita, allowances for external lecturers, and the administration budgets for education and training are set at much lower levels than those of large private companies. There also exists a large gap in education and training between the central and the local governments. According to Kim Pan-Suk (2007: 30), systematic improvements in the local governments’ educational systems are difficult due to budget shortages and the lack of educational awareness by the chiefs of governing bodies. Kim Gwi-Young (2009) also criticized local governments’ conditions for education in terms of budgets and capabilities, which pale in comparison to those of the central government.

2. Lessons

Some successful examples and errors of implementing the career civil service system in Korea are detailed above. Based on these facts, ways to overcome such difficulties in Korean career civil service system are outlined below.

First of all, enhancing the Korean public employees’ accountability should be considered by improving productivity, democracy and the merit system of personnel administration. To improve the efficiency of officials and the merit-based system, the performance of civil servants should be managed properly. Systems that emphasize the process rather than outcome should be fixed. The performance management system should be operated with suitable atmospheres, job types, environments, and program characteristics that include the consideration of total non-financial compensation, rather than with the human resource system that highlights personnel financial differences based on the results of outcome evaluation (Jaerok Oh, 2009: 294). The career system based on representative bureaucracy has grown since the Roh Moo-hyun Administration. However, the system did not eliminate errors such as discrimination. The president can redress these errors through implementing a balanced employment policy and an effective push-ahead system. Also, flexible aims should be set, reflecting the nature of each department. Improvement of ability and management through education or training is required to end the discrimination of civil servants employed. Policy should be legitimized through active defense against criticisms such as attacks against the merit-based system (Chun Oh Park et al, 2010:52~53).
Second, the career civil service system was riddled with problems after adopting the open recruitment and rank-in-job systems. The number of employment based on the open recruitment system founded on rank-in-job system had to be expanded due to the hesitation of the Lee Administration. Specific information regarding issues, rights and responsibilities of public officers were disclosed to civilian applicants in order to address the information gap between civilian applicants and civil servant applicants from within the administration. Guidelines for evaluating applicants’ abilities should be set as well. Long-term salary increase is required so that civilian employees can be paid no less than their previous salaries. Civilian employees should be protected from discrimination by guardians in the ministerial or vice-ministerial level in the workplace (Sung Don Hwang, 2000). Also, open recruitment, rate of organization, range of target job types, and work conditions should be examined and improved. During the operation, standardization is required in selecting appropriate job positions, advertising actively, securing civil experts, and assuring fairness in selection (Kuk Hyun Kim, 2009:18). The new government should review and resolve issues while implementing the ongoing ‘grade five private specialist combination recruitment,’ which has the advantage of unifying recruitment and procedures.

Third, career service should be improved by training and educating Korean public employees to become specialists. Coupled with the strengthening of merit-based system, education will increase professionalism in public service. First of all, educational programs are necessary to resolve problems resulting from insufficient prior training. These programs must be co-managed by universities, private enterprises, and research agencies. A sufficient budget must also be set aside for educational equipment and facilities, bringing in internationally-renowned experts, and designing programs emphasizing real-world applications. These measures force the trainees to engage in active problem solving by making them incorporate everything they have learned from lectures and previous experiences. Public administration should systematically evaluate performance, placement management, and salary to observe the effects of such training and education (Jong Deuk Park, 2012: 269~270).

Finally, the senior civil service should emphasize unity, competitiveness, performance, and responsibility. The Ministry of Public Administration and Security should employ strategic leadership in order to ensure satisfactory performance (Mi Seung Ha, 2008). Autonomy and recruitment integrity should also be balanced for the rational distribution of each department and Ministry of Public Administration and Security’s recruitment functions. All heads of organizations must consider adaptability and results of the senior civil service employed through open or public recruitment. A proper solution is also required to create empathy towards the necessity of openness and competition in public office. Improvement and proper management of the resulting evaluation system is necessary as well. Evaluations
for officials of level 5, fairness and objectivity in the job performance contract system, evaluation of results and recruitment should also be continuously improved. Kyung Ho Cho et al. (2008) viewed the constant monitoring of evaluations regarding open recruitment, autonomous personnel affairs of all ministries, and the job performance contract system as integral in the successful management of senior civil services. The authors also emphasized a wider pool of evaluators is necessary to improve the objectivity of open and public recruitment, evaluations, and proper compensation systems. Also, evaluating each individual’s harmony with the team would yield more valuable results regarding proper performance than excessively evaluating each individual. The obsession with ‘evaluation’ should be redirected to a greater focus on ‘management’ by planning performance objectives strategically. The evaluating system should also be reformed to combine the task unit and organization unit together. By giving more autonomy to the heads and directors of departments, evaluation can become more than mere compilations of a department’s performance (Eun Gyeong Chae et al, 2006: 118~120).
2012 Modularization of Korea’s Development Experience
The Establishment of Career Civil Service System
in the Korean Government

Chapter 5

Suggestions for Developing Countries
We can discover a variety of implications from reviewing the history of Korean Career Civil Service System. The system was introduced in support of the merit system, political neutrality, guarantee of status, and equal opportunities for recruitment. However, pre-existing spoils system presented difficulties for the system’s growth. President Park of the Third Republic pushed through opposition and gradually developed Korean Career Civil Service System by reinforcing rank-in person and open competitive examinations. As a result, during the Fifth and Sixth Republics, the system entered a period of stability. More emphasis was placed on merit, establishing the promotion and job management system, and the current bureaucracy and rank-in person structures. After Kim Young-sam Administration’s (1993~1998) reforms in welfare and pay structures, public officials’ treatment and working conditions improved steadily as well. On the other hand, the new administrative environment required not only the government’s guidance but also the government’s problem-solving solution with cooperation from the private sector. The field of public administration reached high levels of ability and specialty as a result of the dramatically developing economy and society. Korean government has also taken initiatives to address weaknesses in the Korean Career Civil Service System, such as insensitivity to structural and environmental change, bureaucratism, hindrances to growth of public service, and the decline of professionalism. The open career system increased the number of available positions as well. It increased professionalism and officials’ individual ability by emphasizing rigid performance evaluations and providing improved education and training. By adopting a new position classification system emphasizing openness and specialization, the Korean Career Civil Service System departed from its original closed, rank-in person, merit-based system. At the same time, during the development process, the system underwent many trial and errors. Suggestions for developing countries, therefore, are as follows. Bureaucrats and public officials of developing countries are required to
be professional, competent, and cosmopolitan, with flexibility to adapt to the increasing domestic and international changes.

The first suggestion is the introduction of open career and senior civil services system. The minister and vice-minister of each government ministry will be required to assume a supporting role in increasing the adaptability of private external specialists in the closed bureaucracy. The Personnel Office in MOPAS should also consider making appointment standards of a merit-based, open career system to be rigid prerequisites. It should provide its officials with sufficient pay, even if the level of pay is not quite at the private sector level. When recruiting external specialists, the government should strive to decrease the information gap to end any kind of discrimination. Fair opportunities for recruitment should be presented to both public officials and specialists; by doing so, increasing numbers of external specialists will begin to take interest in public service. The Senior Civil Services System also needs to train elite, professional public officials with a cosmopolitan outlook. In regards to international training, the institution should design an appropriate problem-solving type education and training system for its public officials. Such training programs should be supported with long-term funding.

The second suggestion is to strengthen performance management with education and training, focusing on the development of job-related capacities in public officers. Public and private educational institutions should cooperate in order to offer effective education and training programs to public officials. Lecture-based programs should be altered with greater emphasis on active problem-solving and case studies. The personnel office also needs to offer more opportunities for short and long term overseas commissioned education and training. Results from this type of training should generally manifest itself in all areas of the personnel system, such as promotion, merit ratings, and position management. In terms of performance management, different evaluation systems should be enforced for high-ranking and low-ranking public officials. These evaluations are required to depart from the model of a simplistic link between quantitative measurement and monetary incentives. The administration has to create a multifaceted evaluation system according to organized units and tasks units for low-ranking public officials, and to create evaluation frames for high-ranking public officials in order to balance leadership and achievement. In particular, the performance management card system for senior civil servants over grade 4 is required to lay the foundation for personnel management by utilizing the accumulated results and performances from different kinds of evaluations and audits. Finally, if performance results are reflected in personnel management and registered in a personnel database, each developing country can expect an appropriate rise in competitiveness by spurring the curiosity of public officials.


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